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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON STRATEGIC RISK TAKING
Krista Burrill Lewellyn
Old Dominion University
Director: Dr. William Q. Judge
The three essays that comprise this dissertation collectively explore strategic risk
taking. The dissertation is underpinned by the notion that corporate executives take
strategic risks not randomly, but based on the expectation that outcomes are more likely
to be positive rather than negative. Each essay examines how and why decision makers
come to vary in their cognitive evaluation of the acceptability of strategic risk taking.
Essay 1 draws from the approach/inhibition theory of power, to explore how power
not only provides the means for CEOs to exert their risk preferences, but actually affects
what the risk preferences are. Power is theorized to influence CEO cognitions, such that
there is a prevailing focus on the upsides of strategic risk taking and a tendency to
underestimate the downsides, increasing the proclivity to engage in such actions.
Focusing on upsides as opposed to downsides is also evoked in explaining why stock
options induce risk taking, thus the possibility that there are interaction (complementary
or substitutive) effects with CEO power is also explored in a sample of firms listed in the
S&P 1500 from 2003- 2007.
Essay 2 uses the behavioral agency model, to examine how the risk bearing attributes
of specific CEO compensation elements affect the decision to engage in cross-border
acquisitions. This subsequently increases the proclivity to engage in cross-border
acquisitions. Moderating effects of managerial discretion are also evaluated. The
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theoretical model is tested in a sample of US firms operating in four industries from 2007
-2011.

Essay 3 combines the behavioral theory of the firm idea that firm behavior is goal
directed and history dependent with arguments from national social culture literature. A
multilevel model is presented and tested with a multinational sample of firms operating in
the paper products industry. Findings demonstrate outperforming competitors in the past
motivates firm R&D investment and that various cultural dimensions (future orientation,
institutional collectivism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance) of a firm's home
country either encourage or discourage firm R&D investment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Risk taking is an integral part of business and arguably an important element in the
job descriptions for the powerful men and women leading corporations in today's
competitive arena. Risk taking by executives on behalf of their firms has long been a
focus area of strategic management research (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001). The
strategic decisions corporate executives are likely to initiate and participate in, involve
investing in and committing resources prior to fully understanding the potential
performance outcomes, making them inherently risky (Baird & Thomas, 1985;
Chatteijee, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999).
Risk is a multidimensional concept and has been defined in numerous ways often
causing confusion and misunderstanding (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). "Studies of risk
tend to traverse disciplinary boundaries... as they often involve technology, politics,
nature, culture, cognitive schemata, and many other phenomena that the traditional
divisions of academic labor try to keep separate" (Arnoldi, 2009:16).
In classical economic decision theory, risk and uncertainty are defined as two distinct
entities. Traditional views of risk refer to situations where decision makers experience all
possible outcomes (positive and negative relative to expectations) as well as knowing the
probability distributions of their occurrence (Knight, 1921; Luce & Raiffa, 1972).
Uncertainty refers to situations where possible outcomes and the probability distribution
of their occurrence are unknown (Bromiley et al., 2001).
Viewed from a sociological perspective, organization and management scholars have
generally considered risk to be more than just probabilities (Arnoldi, 2009) and tend to
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blur the distinction between risk and uncertainty. As Bettis (1982: 22) observed,
"Technically there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty... Almost all authors after
noting this distinction ignore it and use risk and uncertainty interchangeably." This
probably is not surprising since most strategic decisions, i.e., those involving significant
investment of firm resources and which impact long term performance (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992), involve a level of uncertainty, or unpredictability about their future
consequences (Bromiley et al., 2001). Providing a fitting example, is Baird and Thomas'
(1985) definition, where, strategic risk entails 'venturing into the unknown, [making
moves] that may result in corporate ruin—moves for which the outcomes and
probabilities may be only partially known and where hard to define goals may not be met'
(Baird & Thomas, 1985:231-232).
Researchers (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira,
1995) have demonstrated that managers do indeed conceptualize risk as situations where
they do not know if a positive or negative outcome will result from a choice to take
action (e.g., investing and allocating resources), and perceive that potential losses could
be significant. In this fashion, risk is often referred to as a hazard, loss, damage, or threat,
essentially an unwanted event (Zinn, 2008).
Yet within management literature, risks are not only viewed as a negative force, but
also as being an important element for success, such as in the case of creativity,
entrepreneurship, and needed strategic change (Grant & Berry, 2011; Ling, Simsek,
Lubatkin, & Veiga; Shimizu, 2007; Zahra, 1996). With this in mind, management
research on risk taking tends to distinguish between organizational risk and managerial
risk taking (Bromiley et al., 2001; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999).
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Organizational risk is often depicted as income/financial stream variance or
systematic and unsystematic stock return estimates from the capital asset pricing model
(Bromiley et al., 2001; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Managerial risk taking has been
conceptualized as actual investment decisions that are known to have uncertain outcomes
(Chatteijee & Hambrick, 2011; Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008;
Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Pablo, Sitkin, and Jemison,
1996; Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Since the outcomes are uncertain,
managers evaluate and make judgments about the level and acceptability of risks
associated with firm strategic decisions (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). It is this process, which is
the focus in this dissertation.
Collectively, the three essays seek to address the overarching research question of
how and why firm decision makers vary in strategic risk taking, defined to be making
decisions involving investment and commitment of resources prior to fully understanding
the potential performance outcomes, which may be positive or negative (Chatteijee,
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999).
Because strategic risk taking is a phenomenon that reflects a variety of strategic
decisions and is influenced by factors at multiple levels of analysis, it is an area of
research that has been examined through numerous theoretical perspectives. Research
grounded in agency theory, assumes managers will be more risk averse than shareholders
would prefer and unless incentivized or monitored appropriately, will avoid taking risks
on behalf of their organizations in order to protect their firm specific human capital
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Indeed a large body of interdisciplinary research has demonstrated
that equity incentives, particularly stock options induce risk taking as holders of stock
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options benefit from increases in stock price but do not incur losses when stock prices
fall, thus, they are perceived to offer only upside benefits with respect to risk taking
(Devers et al., 2008).
Relatedly, in the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998),
prospect and agency theories are integrated, and managers rather than being risk averse,
are assumed to be loss averse. Therefore different types of compensation impart different
levels of risk bearing (i.e., threats to personal wealth). Variance in risk bearing is
theorized to exert different effects on decision makers' perceptions. When perceived
threats to one's wealth are low, risk taking is more likely.
Another theoretical perspective often used in strategic risk taking research is Cyert
and March's (1963) behavioral theory of the firm. This perspective suggests risk taking
arises when decision makers engage in search processes, which are motivated by
comparing current or expected performance to an aspiration level. Behavioral theory of
the firm posits that decision makers take risks when they believe that by doing so they
will achieve gains that bring them closer to their aspired target or when they have
sufficient slack resources to protect them from severe losses.
These dominant theoretical frameworks used in risk taking research (Audia & Greve,
2006; Bromiley et al., 2001) diverge on their basic underlying assumptions and support
different antecedents of risk taking. However, they all converge on the notion that risk
taking is more likely to occur when decision makers expect the risk taking will achieve
positive outcomes, whereas if negative outcomes are expected, risk taking is rejected.
This observation aligns with ideas put forth by cognition scholars (e.g., Bandura,
2001) who suggest individuals cognitively represent future outcomes in the present,
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which results in choices being motivated and directed by anticipated outcomes. Drawing
from this premise, I conjecture that decision makers vary in their strategic risk taking
because they vary in their cognition processes, where "cognition is a forward-looking
form of intelligence that is premised on an actor's beliefs about the linkage between the
choice of actions and the subsequent impact of those actions on outcomes." (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000: 113). All three essays are underpinned by this fundamental notion that
corporate executives engage in strategic risk taking not randomly, but based on the
expectation that the outcomes are more likely to provide positive rather than negative
outcomes for their organizations and themselves.
Each essay seeks to explicate how and why decision makers come to vary in their
cognitive representations of the acceptability of strategic risk taking. Collectively, the
essays strive to develop a cognitive-based model that deepens and expands understanding
of micro and macro antecedents of strategic risk taking. In doing so, the goal is to
provide new theoretical insights that not only extend current theory but also challenge the
logic underpinning previously used theoretical frameworks. This will hopefully give
organizational scholars greater flexibility in their research.
In the first essay of this dissertation, I bring together research streams from strategic
management, organizational theory, and social psychology to focus on the constructs of
risk taking and power in organizations. I develop and test theory that seeks to examine
how and why CEOs vary in their tendencies to take risks on behalf of their organizations.
Although recognizing that many risky decisions will also be influenced by preferences of
other executives, there is sufficient precedent in the literature supporting the view that the
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CEO is the most influential and powerful actor within the firm (Bigley & Wiersema,
2002; Childs, 1972; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Jensen & Zajac, 2004
Implicit in scholarly research examining risk taking by CEOs on behalf of their firms,
is the notion that CEOs have the means of exerting their will, or in other words, the
power to pursue their penchant for taking or avoiding risks. From an agency theory
perspective, CEO power arises from inadequate monitoring by shareholders and boards
of directors (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002), and with the primary theoretical
assumption of risk aversion, powerful CEOs (those not subject to adequate monitoring)
will be inclined to do just that (Carpenter, Pollock, & O'Leary, 2003; Miller & Chen,
2004).
Despite extensive research, agency theory based predictions concerning risk taking
have proven to be weak and inconsistent (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).
Scholars (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003; Sanders & Hambrick 2007; Wiseman & GomezMejia, 1996), have suggested the lack of distinct relationships may be due to the agency
theory assumption that managers will have stable risk preferences, being either risk
averse or risk-neutral, failing to consider that there may be contexts in which they may be
risk seekers. By informing the research with the approach/inhibition theory of power, I
advance and test an alternative argument that power not only provides the means by
which CEOs are able to exert their preferences, but actually motivates what the
preferences are.
The approach/inhibition theory of power posits that when an individual experiences
power, his or her behavioral approach system is activated whereas when there is a lack of
power, the behavioral inhibition system is triggered (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,
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2003). When the approach system is dominating, the individual's focus is directed to the
potential upsides and reward aspects of risky actions and away from downsides or
potential threats, subsequently leading to a greater likelihood of risk taking (Keltner et al,
2003).
This logic that focusing on upsides and downplaying downsides is similar to
theorizing about why stock options encourage risk taking. A number of studies (e.g.,
Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2010; Devers et al., 2008; Sanders, 2001; Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007) demonstrating stock option compensation is positively related to risk
taking argue that stock option compensation makes CEOs attentive to upsides associated
with increasing their personal wealth to the detriment of considering possible downsides.
This suggests the constructs of CEO power and stock options may act as complements or
substitutes for encouraging CEO strategic risk taking. I test this proposition by
evaluating interaction effects, to determine if increasing levels of the accumulated value
of CEO stock options amplify or diminish the influence of CEO power on risk taking.
A key contribution of this work is that by exploring the possibility of a "dual causal
structure between power and compensation that has not been investigated" (Finkelstein et
al., 2009: 322), by strategy researchers, an important gap in the literature is addressed.
Secondly, by informing the research with the approach/inhibition theory of power, I
demonstrate that rather than power merely providing the means by which CEOs are able
to exert their preferences, it is a force that also motivates their preferences for risk taking.
The theoretical framework contributes towards addressing a key issue concerning agency
theory, as highlighted by scholars (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003; Wiseman & GomezMejia, 1998): the lack of development of the risk taking construct, most notably the
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prevailing assumption that managers have stable risk preferences, being either risk averse
or risk-neutral.
In the second essay, I also use theories that consider how individuals are motivated or
dissuaded from engaging in risks on behalf of their organizations, therefore, again the
focus is on the CEO as the primary organizational decision maker of interest. Drawing
from the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and the
accumulated executive compensation research, I generate new theoretical insights on how
the under-analyzed elements of retirement pay in conjunction with stock options,
influence a CEO's risk bearing (perceived threats to his/her wealth) and ultimately the
propensity for undertaking cross-border acquisitions.
Acquisitions entail significant investment and commitment of firm resources prior to
fully understanding the potential performance outcomes, which may be positive or
negative (Sanders, 2001). They also often result in significant variance in returns and
therefore have been characterized as risky decisions (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Jensen &
Ruback, 1983; Sanders, 2001).
An extensive body of research has demonstrated executive compensation
arrangements influence firm decision making including those associated with acquisition
activity (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004;
Matta & Beamish, 2008; Sanders, 2001). Previous executive compensation research
undertaken from an agency theory perspective (O'Reilly & Main, 2010; Tosi, Werner,
Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000), has prescribed awarding equity based compensation in
order to align the interests of risk averse managers and risk neutral shareholders (Jensen
& Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Stock options in particular have been positively
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associated with both domestic acquisition activity (Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick,
2007; Wright, Kroll, Lado & Van Ness, 2002) and cross-border acquisitions (Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2001; Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; Matta & Beamish,
2008).
However, as demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman,
Gomez Mejia, & Melbourne ,2007; Sanders, 2001) and summarized in a recent review by
Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder (2007), equity-based compensation research has
revealed much more complex relationships with firm outcomes than previous agency
arguments suggest. This has led scholars to move away from applying classical agency
theory centric reasoning, to behavioral models (e.g., Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998;
Devers et al., 2008) in order to more deeply examine how individual elements of
executive compensation influence strategic decision making. The current study
endeavors to add to these efforts by developing and testing theory concerning how stock
options and the understudied compensation element of retirement pay motivate CEOs to
engage in cross-border acquisitions.
In the wake of new SEC disclosure rules, the business media and academic scholars have
begun to highlight the substantial levels of retirement pay (pensions and deferred
compensation) many U.S. CEOs have garnered. The study is among the first to examine
the effect CEO retirement pay may have on corporate strategic decisions and therefore
contributes insights to both the executive compensation and strategic risk taking
literature, in particular that associated with cross-border acquisition research. The
research also serves to extend the predictive applicability of the behavioral agency model
as well as refines the boundaries of the theory by explicating the role of managerial
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discretion in moderating the relationships between compensation elements and CEO risk
taking.
In essay 3, the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) is used to frame
the conceptual reasoning along with national culture constructs (Hofstede, 2001; House et
al., 2007). For this reason, the focus is on firm level, or the collective risk propensities of
decision makers, as determinants of strategic risk taking within the cross-national
context. In this study, I investigate how national social cultural dimensions of a firm's
home country create a context that either encourages or discourages firm level risk taking
in a sample of paper product industry firms from 11 countries.
There is a long tradition of attributing the variation in strategic investments (e.g.,
R&D, capital investments) across firms to past performance, both positive and negative
(Chen, 2008; Greve 2003). Scholars drawing from Cyert and March's (1963) behavioral
theory of the firm suggest that firms compare their performance relative to an aspiration
level, not just on em absolute value. The comparisons, serve to motivate the firm to
engage in search processes that either solve short-term problems or provide innovative
new technologies and/or products (Cyert & March, 1963).
Behavioral theory of the firm contends firm behavior manifested as strategic choices
is goal directed and history dependent (Levitt & March, 1988), and since much of
behavioral theory of the firm research has been conducted in single country settings, little
consideration has been given to how the values, beliefs and assumptions that constitute
the culture within national boundaries may encourage and enable pursuing some types of
goals while discouraging and hindering others. In this study I seek to address this gap.
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The study strives to make a significant contribution to the literature in four specific
ways. First, while there has been a considerable work investigating determinants of
strategic investments with single country samples, my analysis using data from firms
operating in a single industry in 11 countries, provides the opportunity to tease out the
relative importance of various firm and national culture variables. Second, I present new
evidence on how a firm's home country cultural dimensions motivate and inhibit firm
level investments thus addressing concerns raised by scholars (e.g., Venaik & Brewer,
2011) of the scarcity of studies looking at national cultural dimensions and firm level
decisions. Third, I provide empirical support that behavioral theory of the firm
predictions may be influenced by national cultural context, as different cultures may
place different weights on goal directed behavior and risk taking. Fourth, by using both
GLOBE and Hofstede cultural measures in the analysis, a more comprehensive
understanding of the effects of culture on firm level R&D investments results. In
addition, I contribute to the debate and the efforts to further understand how and why
these sets of national culture measures converge and diverge with respect to firm level
decisions.
The development and design of the three studies that comprise this dissertation reflect
the multifaceted nature of strategic risk taking. Each essay utilizes different
representations of strategic risk taking that have been used in the extant literature and
examines an overlooked or understudied determinant of strategic risk taking in
conjunction with previously studied constructs. Multiple theories are used to develop the
conceptual logic driving each analysis. Empirical testing of the hypotheses using three
different pooled cross-sectional time series data sets and various statistical techniques
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(generalized least squares with random effects, negative binomial regression with random
effects, and hierarchical linear modeling) demonstrates support for the theoretical models.
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CHAPTER 2
FOCUSING ON UPSIDES AND DOWNPLAYING DOWNSIDES: THE ROLE
OF CEO POWER AND STOCK OPTIONS IN STRATEGIC RISK TAKING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Risk taking is an integral part of business and is arguably one of the most important
elements of the job descriptions for the powerful men and women leading corporations
today. Consequently, risk taking by executives on behalf of their firms has long been a
focus area of strategic management research (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001).
Implicit in scholarly research examining risk taking by CEOs on behalf of their firms,
is the notion that CEOs have the means of exerting their will and the power to pursue
certain risky options while avoiding others. From an agency theory perspective, CEOs
are generally considered to be risk averse and their power arises from inadequate
monitoring by shareholders and boards of directors (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia,
2002). Hence, powerful CEOs will be disinclined to engage in risk taking in order to
protect their individual interests (Carpenter, Pollock, & O'Leary, 2003; Miller & Chen,
2004).
Despite extensive research, agency - based predictions concerning risk taking have
proven to be weak and inconsistent (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Scholars
have suggested the lack of distinct relationships may be due to the agency theory
assumption that managers will have stable risk preferences, being either exclusively riskaverse or risk-neutral, and failing to consider that there may be some contexts in which
they may be risk seekers (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003; Sanders & Hambrick 2007;
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). We agree with this critique and advance an

24

alternative argument that CEO power relative to the board not only provides the means
by which CEOs exert their preferences; it actually influences what their preferences are.
We build our theoretical framework from a rapidly growing stream of research by
social psychologists (Anderson, & Berdrahl, 2002; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee, Galinsky, &
Gruenfeld, 2007) that has theorized and shown experimentally that possessing power, is
associated with an increased proclivity to take risks. This conceptualization of how power
affects cognitions and behavior with respect to risk taking is referred to as the
approach/inhibition (A/I) theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003). It posits that when an
individual possesses power his or her behavioral approach (as opposed to inhibition)
system is activated. This leads the individual to primarily focus attention to the potential
upsides and reward aspects of risky actions, while downplaying downsides or potential
threats, subsequently leading to a greater likelihood of risk taking (Keltner et al, 2003).
The idea that a focus on upside potential outcomes and away from downsides
associated with risk taking, leads to greater likelihood for engaging in such actions, aligns
with ideas put forth by cognition scholars (e.g., Bandura, 2001; Gavetti & Levinthal,
2000) who suggest individuals cognitively represent future outcomes in the present.
Consequently, individual choices are motivated and directed by anticipated outcomes
(Bandura, 2001).
This notion that powerful corporate executives engage in strategic risk taking based
on the expectation that the outcomes are more likely to provide positive rather than
negative outcomes has also been evoked in explaining relationships between stock
options and risk taking. Holders of stock options benefit from increases in stock price but
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do not incur costs or losses when stock prices fall, thus, stock options are argued to
induce risk taking as they are perceived to offer only upside benefits (Devers McNamara,
Wiseman, & Aarfelt, 2008; Poteshman, Parrino, & Weisbach, 2005). Numerous
empirical studies have demonstrated stock options do indeed promote risk taking
(Bromiley et al., 2001; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007).
Building on the observation that both power and stock options may influence CEOs
to focus on the potential upsides of risky ventures and downplay the potential magnitude
and likelihood of downsides associated with risk taking, we surmise that possessing
power and stock options affects the CEO's cognitive framing of potential outcomes.
Cognitive framing is the means by which a decision maker infers meaning and
understanding of the choice situation (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1981), emphasizing or
filtering out certain aspects thereby influencing interpretations of future outcomes as
being either favorable or unfavorable (Bateman & Zeithaml,1989; Walsh, 1995).
This notion that both power and stock options influence cognitive processes such that
there is a predominant focus on the upsides of risk taking leads to some interesting new
questions. First, does the experience of power impact CEO risk taking in a similar fashion
as stock options, such that it encourages strategic risk taking? Second, are there
interaction effects, such that increasing levels of CEO stock option compensation amplify
or diminish the influence of CEO power? Or more specifically, do CEO power and stock
options compensation interact as substitutes or complements, to impact the degree of risk
taking by CEOs on behalf of their firms?
In examining these important questions, our theory and subsequent empirical findings
make several contributions to the literature. First, to guide our analysis, we draw from
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social psychology literature to enrich theoretical perspectives concerning phenomena
scholars have highlighted as warranting farther understanding and study: how decision
makers' cognitive processes may motivate variance in their proclivity for risk taking on
behalf of their organizations (Shapira, 1995) and the socio-cognitive implications of the
experience of power by those who lead organizations (Finkelstein et al., 2009). By
grounding our research within the A/I theory of power, we empirically demonstrate that
rather than power merely providing the means by which CEOs are able to exert their
preferences, it is also a substantive force that can motivate their risk preferences. This
provides a theoretical alternative to the much critiqued (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003;
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) logic of agency theory models, whereby managers are
assumed to prefer to avoid risk taking for their firms.
Second, we heed calls for increasing understanding of how decision makers'
cognitive processes impact firm level phenomenon (Fiol & Huff, 1992; Porac & Thomas,
2002) by arguing and demonstrating empirically that the possession of power and of
stock options similarly influence the way executives perceive future outcomes for
themselves and their firms, which then drives their risk taking initiatives. Furthermore,
as highlighted by Finkelstein et al., (2009: 322), the possibility of a "dual causal structure
between power and compensation... has not been investigated" by strategy researchers.
Therefore, this study's focus on the overlapping cognitive mechanisms that power and
stock option compensation share with respect to risk taking addresses an important gap in
the literature.
Additionally, our findings that different types of stock options interact with CEO
power in different ways provide a novel contribution to executive compensation research,

27

which advocates consideration of the nuanced role individual pay elements have in
eliciting actions executives take on behalf of their organizations (e.g., Devers et al., 2008;
Sanders, 2001; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Finally, our integration of the A/I theory of power with research on strategic decision
making in organizations, extends the boundaries of this theory. In doing so, it may offer
opportunities for it to emerge as a viable means for farther explaining, predicting and
understanding how individual behaviors impact organizational phenomena.
2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Strategic Risk Taking
Strategic risk taking by CEOs refers to making decisions on behalf of their
organization, where the outcomes of the decision are highly uncertain, unpredictable and
have the potential of generating large gains or losses (Baird & Thomas, 1985; Chatteijee
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Shapira, 1995).
This formal definition is compatible with how practicing managers view risk in
decision making (e.g., MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; March & Shapira, 1987;
Shapira, 1995). Specifically, research has shown that managers conceptualize risk taking
as referring to situations where they do not know if a positive or negative outcome will
result from a choice to take action (e.g., investing and allocating resources), contrary to
depictions in classical decision theory that makes a clear distinction between risk and
uncertainty.1 A choice that has a more certain expected outcome is considered less risky

1 In

classical economic decision theory risk refers to situations where all possible
outcomes and the probabilities of their occurrence are known while uncertainty refers to
situations where possible outcomes and the probability distribution of their occurrence
are unknown (Knight, 1921; Luce & Raffia)
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from a manager's perspective (March & Shapira, 1987). In addition, the riskiness of
decisions has more to with the possible threat of loss than opportunities for gains. This is
in contrast to viewing risky decisions as those where known probability distributions of
outcomes exhibit greater variance both positive and negative (Shapira, 1995).
CEOs rarely if ever have complete information about outcomes associated with
decisions they are likely to initiate or be engaged in on behalf of their organizations, i.e.,
strategic type ones involving significant allocation of resources intended to affect long
term performance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). It is also unlikely that information about
the possible outcomes is so scarce that subjective probability estimates are impossible
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Decision makers can and do assess the likely consequences of
pursuing various strategies
In experimental studies with managers, Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) found that
when risky investment decisions were framed as offering potential gains, they were
viewed more attractively and thus more likely to be taken. Also, Palich and Bagby (1995)
found that entrepreneurs have greater tendencies than non-entrepreneurs to focus
attention on the likelihood of favorable outcomes and to categorize or frame situations as
opportunities. They theorize this positive framing, rather than an inherent risk taking
disposition, is what drives the often observed risk taking propensity that is associated
with entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, in a review of extant risk taking research,
Sitkin and Pablo (1992: 25) come to the conclusion that "risk behavior is ultimately
determined by the label attached to a risky situation." In other words, decision makers
vary in their strategic risk taking because they vary in their cognitive framing of the
expected outcomes of their strategic risk taking decisions.
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Cognitive Framing of Strategic Risk Taking Outcomes
Cognitive framing of strategic risk taking outcomes essentially affects how decision
makers infer meaning and understanding of a choice situation (Tverksy & Kahneman,
1981). By framing, we are not referring to the use of language and labels to express
understanding of the decision (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983) as often employed by
behavioral decision theory researchers in risk taking experiments. Rather, our use of the
concept of cognitive framing refers to an individual CEO's cognition process, where
"cognition is a forward-looking form of intelligence that is premised on an actor's beliefs
about the linkage between the choice of actions and the subsequent impact of those
actions on outcomes." (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000: 113). Thus, CEOs' cognitive
framing processes reveal or highlight certain aspects while filtering out others, thereby
influencing their perceptions and interpretations of what the outcome of a decision may
be (Benford & Snow, 2000). This suggests that an inherently risky strategic decision,
such as an acquisition might be viewed by one CEO as an opportunity for gains, while
another might see it as unnecessary risk taking that could lead to substantial losses.
The notion that variation in cognitions and interpretations by decision makers
subsequently influence the choices they make on behalf of their organizations is well
established in organizational research (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Kaplan, 2011;
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) beginning with Simon's (1947) bounded rationality argument
and empirical work on information processing subsequently advanced by others such as
Daft and Weick (1984), Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Porac, Thomas, and BadenFuller (1989).
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Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that the extent to which biases and
cognitions of top executives affect organizational outcomes is dependent upon the level
of discretion or latitude of action, they have. Discretion is similar to power, in that "it
exists when there is an absence of constraint" (Hambrick, 2007: 335), but has been
described as being a "more diffuse construct" (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012: 854).
Specifically, discretion is a function of how much the environmental factors permit
variety; or how much the CEO is able to perceive "multiple courses of action" and the
extent to which the organization "empowers the chief executive to formulate and execute
those actions" (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: 379). Therefore, an important precursor
to CEO discretion will be the level of power the CEO possesses. This is consistent with
the resource dependency view of power, whereby an organizational actor derives power
from two conditions: (1) the actor has minimal dependence upon others, such that he or
she is not constrained in pursuing preferences, and (2) others' dependence on the actor is
maximized (Brass, 1984; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
In sum, the constructs of power and managerial discretion have been treated as
theoretically distinct in previous research (e.g., Daily & Johnson, 1997; Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1993; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012) and we do the same. Hence in the current
study in assessing the capacity to which the CEO's preferences are reflected in the
choices he or she makes for the organization, we focus on the more fundamental
construct of power, which captures the internal organizational sources of discretion,
though we do consider how the external environmental discretion affects risk taking in
our empirical analysis, above and beyond internal organizational explanations.
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CEO Power and Strategic Risk Taking
Power is a central feature of organizational life and the idea that powerful people
think and act differently about themselves and others is prevalent in a variety of social
science disciplines (Boulding, 1989; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). CEOs are generally
considered to be the "most powerful member of the corporate elite" (Jensen & Zajac,
2004:513). However, the level of CEO power varies from organization to organization.
Power allows a CEO to secure and control resources that others in the organization
are dependent upon, thus reducing uncertainty for the organization (Pfeffer, 1981). This
in turn increases the CEO's capacity to exert his or her preferences, as power enables the
CEO to influence and control others as well as having freedom from other's influence
and control (Brass, 1984; Galinsky et al., 2008). In the case of CEOs, the relevant others,
are those most likely to be involved in the initiating and approving of firm level decisions
involving risk, other members of the board of directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Pearce &
Zahra, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). In organizational literature, CEO power is often
conceptualized as a relational construct, whereby the level of CEO power is relative to
the board of directors and/or top management team (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Much of the research considering the association between a CEO's power and the risk
taking he or she takes on behalf of the organization has been framed theoretically by
agency theory with its assumptions of self-interested and risk averse CEOs (Finkelstein et
al., 2009). Agency theory, based on the potential divergence of interests when ownership
and control of the firm are separate, argues that unlike shareholders who are able to
diversify their personal wealth across various firms, managers in order to shield their
non-diversifiable human capital will be more risk averse than shareholders would prefer
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them to be (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency
theory argues when CEOs are powerful, they may "prevent or forestall board
involvement in strategic actions" gaining implicit control over the board and the ability to
pursue self-interested actions (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993.35).
Agency theory prescriptions for mitigating the likelihood of managerial opportunism,
which can result from the combination of differences in risk preferences and information
asymmetry, call for monitoring systems which reduce a CEO's power to pursue his or her
risk averse preferences (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Carpenter et al., 2003; Miller & Chen,
2004) and instituting incentive "mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of agents to
align them with the interests of the principals" (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1996: 133).
However, these underlying predictions that CEOs will use their power to pursue their
own self-interests, which are assumed to include avoiding risks have led to the
conclusion that "risk remains an underdeveloped concept within agency theory"
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 133) and that "power is a more comprehensive
variable than what agency theorists have implied" (Grabhe-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia,
2002:14).
To further the saliency of these critiques and to address concerns that in the extant
literature, conceptualizations of "power only tells us whose interests are likely to be
pursued not what those specific interests are" (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 375) we draw
from social psychology where an "exploding body of research has confirmed that power
fundamentally alters how an individual construes and approaches the world" (Galinsky et
al., 2008:1451).
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The work by Keltner et al., (2003) has been particularly influential, operating under
the perspective of the A/I theory of power. Specifically, this theory argues that the
possession or lack of power differentially activates either the neurobiological approach or
inhibition behavioral systems driving differences in attention, cognitions, motivations,
and behaviors (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Activating the behavioral approach system
leads individuals to focus primarily on positive outcomes. In contrast, when the
behavioral inhibition system is activated, the focus is on avoiding negative outcomes
(Karniol & Ross, 1996; Keltner et al., 2003).
The A/I theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) argues that the experience of power
triggers the behavioral approach system generating a cognitive bias with respect to the
way an individual frames and perceives the riskiness of certain decisions such that the
upside potential is given maximum focus and the downside consequences are minimized
or ignored (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). A
lack of power increases the activation of the behavioral inhibition system, leading the
powerless to act in a constrained manner (Carver & White, 1994). Furthermore, the two
behavioral systems are antagonistic to each other's functioning such that increasing
activation of the approach system leads to deactivation of the inhibition system (Hirsh,
Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011). Several series of experimental studies confirm that those with
power were more likely to engage in risk taking as they perceived the expected outcomes
to result in rewards not losses compared to those without power (Anderson & Galinsky,
2006; Galinsky et al., 2008).
Researchers testing A/I theory predictions consider power to be the capacity to
"impose influence and constraints on others" as well as being relatively free "from the
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influence of external forces" (Galinsky et al., 2008: 1450). In our research context, this
definition aptly applies to CEOs. It is also compatible with definitions used in previous
organizational research, i.e. the capacity to exert influence to modify the behavior of
others in some intended way (Pfeffer, 1981) and "the capacity of individual actors to
exert their will" (Finkelstein, 1992: 506). Therefore we extend the notion that power is
the means by which a CEO fulfills his or her preferences by applying the A/I theory of
power to explain how power also motivates the cognitions driving the preferences.
The idea that power may impact CEO's cognitive processes also finds support in
organizational cognition literature. In a review of this body of work, Walsh (1995)
concludes the research suggests the development of cognitive frames is influenced by
individual, social and informational factors. The experience of power is personal yet
arises from social interaction patterns (Pfeffer, 1992), which have been shown to
influence the variance in the content of cognitive frames (Rentsch 1990). In addition,
research has demonstrated an individual's location in an organization's hierarchy,
indicative of structural power (French & Raven, 1959; Finkelstein, 1992), also influences
cognitive frames (Hauenstein & Foti 1989).
The few empirical studies assessing the influence of various CEO power measures on
strategic risk taking actions, while not applying the theoretical logic we put forth in this
paper, implicitly support our theory and could be informed by our theoretical perspective.
For example, in a recent study, Haynes and Hillman (2010) test the direct effects of board
capital on the deviation from industry norms of several resource allocation decisions as
well as moderating effects of CEO power. They ground their hypothesized moderating
effects of CEO power in agency theory, arguing power permits the CEO to pursue his or

her (risk averse) preferences by mitigating "the independent judgment of the board...[and
to] dampen the effect of the board" (Haynes & Hillman, 2010: 1150).
Contrary to the hypothesized prediction, they find that CEO power lessens the
negative relationship between board depth and strategic change. Additionally, their
results indicate (counter to agency predictions) a direct positive relationship between
CEO power and strategic deviation from industry norms, which could be construed as
risk taking. Applying the A/I theory of power provides a salient explanation for
addressing these anomalous findings. .
Similarly, a study by Tang, Crossan, and Rowe (2011) also implicitly supports our
theory and could be informed by applying our logic. They find that CEOs who dominate
their top management teams are more likely to have firm level strategies that deviate
from the industry average. Their theoretical argument, based on an integration of neoinstitutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert
& March, 1963) and political perspectives (Allison, 1971), is that top management team
members will generally prefer to follow industry norms as this will be less risky and
more legitimate and that for deviance to occur there must be a dominant CEO (Tang et
al., 2011: 4). Thus, they explain how a CEO may be able to exert his/her will for strategic
deviance, but not why a CEO would be inclined towards such activities that other
executives deem as too risky. In contrast, our theory would suggest that power provides
not merely the means, but also the motivation for taking the risky actions that deviate
from industry norms.
As previously described, we expect strategic risk taking will be more likely when the
CEO is focused on the positive aspects rather than negative ones associated with the
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outcomes of strategic risk taking. Essentially, by ignoring potential downside outcomes,
the risky venture is viewed as being less risky when the CEO is relatively powerful.
Applying the A/I theory of power provides a coherent, parsimonious and relatively
nuanced explanation for why a CEO foresees that strategic risk taking will result in
upsides and not downsides, making the risk taking more acceptable. Therefore, we
propose:
Hypothesis 1: CEO power is positively related to strategic risk taking.
CEO Stock Options and Strategic Risk Taking
We have proposed that CEOs engage in strategic risk taking because the experience
of power leads them to cognitively frame the potential outcomes of a given decision more
positively than negatively. The upside focus logic is similar to that used to explain why a
large body of empirical research has shown CEO stock options encourage strategic risk
taking.
Stock options are contracts that grant shares at a certain price and after a period of
time (known as the "vesting period" typically lasting three to five years), but before an
expiration date (usually 10 years) allow the recipient to choose when he or she wishes to
exercise, i.e., sell the stock at the current market price (Hall & Murphy, 2002).
Underpinned by the portfolio assumption of risk and return being positively correlated,
agency theory predicts awarding equity type bonuses should incentivize managers to take
risks in order to increase stock price and therefore their own personal wealth. Since stock
options do not impose costs on the recipients even if stock prices decline, they have been
theorized to reduce risk aversion in executives as "CEOs are assumed to perceive limited
downside risk" associated with these compensation elements (Devers et al, 2008:551).
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CEO stock option compensation for the most part has been shown to be positively
associated with strategic risk taking initiatives, such as R&D spending (Devers et al.,
2008; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) , capital expenditures (Deutsch, Keil, Laamanen,
2010), greater use of long-term debt (Devers et al., 2008), exploration in oil and gas
industries (Rajagopal & Shevlin, 2002), long term investments in the cable television
industry (Souder & Shaver, 2010), undertaking a greater number of acquisitions (Sanders,
2001), and making larger investments in acquisitions (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).
Much of the extant research has considered stock options as an aggregate variable and
assessed the incentive effects of awarding stock options (e.g., Harris & Bromiley, 2007;
Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). However, over time a CEO's stock option
wealth changes, since the payout from stock options to the recipient is the difference
between the price the stock was awarded at and the current market price of the stock.
When the current stock price is greater than the awarded price, the stock options are
considered to be 'in-the-money.' Therefore at any given time some of the in-the-money
options will be exercisable (having met the vesting requirements) and others will be
unexercisable.
Given these nuances associated with stock options, recent studies (e.g., Devers et al.,
2008; Souder & Shaver, 2010) have drawn distinctions between exercisable and
unexercisable options, theorizing these characteristics may have differential effects on
strategic risk taking. We theorize that these differences, which essentially represent
current wealth (exercisable) and future wealth (unexercisable) will be particularly
relevant in interaction with CEO power, because of the joint impact on cognitive
processes. Therefore, consistent with recent research (Devers et al., 2008; Deutsch et al.,
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2010), we distinguish between exercisable and unexercisable stock options in developing
our hypotheses on the relationship between stock options and risk taking. .
Exercisable stock options. Devers et al. (2008) drawing from Wiseman and GomezMejia's (1998) behavioral agency model, which incorporates prospect theory logic and
Thaler's (1980) concept of an instant endowment effect, argue that CEOs endow the
accumulated value of exercisable stock into their assessments of personal wealth. With
the behavioral agency assumption that CEOs are loss averse, their choices will reflect a
stronger desire to shield the accumulated value of stock options as opposed to possibly
increasing the value. Because of this increased risk bearing (i.e., perceived threats to this
wealth) associated with strategic risk taking, Devers et al. (2008) hypothesizes a
curvilinear relationship between the accumulated value of exercisable options and
strategic risk taking, whereby the greatest risk taking occurs at moderate levels. The
empirical analysis showed a significant positive relationship between the accumulated
value of exercisable options and the combined strategic risk taking activities of R&D
investments, capital expenditures, and long term debt levels, with the relationship
becoming insignificant at higher levels rather than significantly dropping off.
Contrary to Devers et al. (2008), we theorize that the endowment mechanism is less
salient than processes that motivate strategic risk taking by CEOs. Specifically, we argue
that since exercisable stock options can be cashed in at any time allowing the CEO to
amass wealth immediately or at any desired time of his or her choosing, having this
flexibility to increase current wealth may impart feelings of power. In other words, the
power associated with exercisable options may activate approach mechanisms further
augmenting a CEO's focus on the upsides and reward aspects associated with risk taking.
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In addition, CEOs have the ability to bring their overall level of stock option wealth that
is at risk back to a moderate level, by exercising a portion of the options, as stock options
are usually issued in different lot sizes. This will empower the CEO as s/he is likely to
experience feelings of greater control over the status of his or her current wealth,
Empirical support for our prediction is also found in work by Malemendler and Tate
(2008). Their results indicate a significant positive association between the value of
exercisable stock options held by a CEO and the firm's acquisition activity. Acquisition
investments are likely to be a form of strategic risk taking that a CEO perceives may
impact stock price (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) increasing the importance of perceptions of
control over when to cash in the options. Therefore we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: The accumulated value of exercisable stock options held by the CEO is
positively related to strategic risk taking.
Unexercisable stock options. With unexercisable options, the value is attained at a
future date when the options become vested. Therefore even though they are in-themoney and have cash value, this value represents future wealth. Devers et al. (2008)
argues that CEOs will be less likely to endow the value of these types of stock options
into their current wealth, and therefore they will be positively related to strategic risk
taking. Their results demonstrate support for this prediction. Furthermore, Souder and
Shaver (2010) also find a positive relationship between the value of unexercisable stock
options held by managers and their proxy for risk taking, adding systems and new
channels in a sample of cable television firms.
As unexercisable options are likely to represent those that have been awarded in the
more recent past, they may serve as a cue to the CEO of his/her past successful

performance. If, they do indeed reflect past success, this is likely to increase the board's
esteem of the CEO as he or she may be viewed as being particularly adept and skilled,
and thus may be subject to less scrutiny by directors (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Together
this situation is likely to trigger a greater sense of power, leading to increased activation
of the behavioral approach system and in turn, greater strategic risk taking. While not
disagreeing with Devers et al.'s (2008) theoretical arguments that CEOs may be less
concerned with protecting the potential value associated with this type of options, we
strengthen the argument by suggesting reasons why CEOs' perceptions about the
potential for gains are particularly salient. Therefore we also hypothesize a positive
association between this type of stock option and strategic risk taking.
Hypothesis 3: The accumulated value of unexercisable stock options held by the CEO
is positively related to strategic risk taking.

Interactive Effects of CEO Power and Stock Options
We have argued that CEO power triggers the approach behavioral system to the
deference of the inhibition system thereby orienting the CEO to focus on opportunities
for gain and reducing perceptions of potential losses associated with strategic risk taking.
Likewise, we have asserted that having greater accumulated value of exercisable and
unexercisable stock options leads to greater risk taking, as stock options are perceived to
offer upsides while shielding the holder from losses. Additionally, amassing current or
future wealth from these seemingly costless elements may increase a CEO's sense of
power, further activating approach tendencies.
In the psychology literature, wealth has long been associated with the experience of
power as it allows one to exert influence over others with less wealth and imparts feelings
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of being less constrained in securing desired resources (Furnham & Argyle, 1998).
Building on this logic and the nuanced differences between exercisable and unexercisable
stock options, such that they reflect current and future wealth respectively, we develop
theoretical arguments that the different types of stock options interact with power in
different ways in eliciting strategic risk taking.
Interaction effects of CEO power and exercisable stock options. We suggest the
incentivizing effects of exercisable stock options, which are viewed as current wealth,
will be stronger in interaction with CEO power. Likewise a CEO's focus on upsides due
to power will be stronger with high levels of exercisable stock options. We surmise that
the activation of approach tendencies by the experience of power may counteract any
inhibition tendencies arising from concerns about losses to the level of current wealth, or
what is sometimes characterized as endowment effects (Thaler & Johnson, 1990).
Similarly, because this type of option may be cashed in at any time, and the CEO has
elected not to do so, it implies that powerful CEOs may indeed be less concerned about
downside losses, anticipating the stock price will increase even more. In essence, we
propose that a CEO's power and current wealth attributed to exercisable stock options
interact as complements in a mutually reinforcing way to promote strategic risk taking.
Stock options have been argued to encourage CEOs to take risks by focusing their
attention on the upside potential to increase their own personal wealth while not incurring
losses (Hall & Liebman, 1998). The upside focus induced by power may or may not be
exclusively associated with personal wealth gain, particularly if we allow for a more
socialized view of CEOs. Social psychology research has demonstrated that powerful
people exhibit greater goal oriented focus during the setting of, initiating of and striving

towards goals (Guinote, 2007). Therefore power may trigger approach tendencies,
promoting an upside focus towards achieving organizational goals (e.g., revenue growth,
sales from new products). When combined with the motivational effects of the stock
options, which make risk taking activities desirable for personal wealth gain, the
cognitive tendencies for focusing on the upsides of risk taking are likely to be even more
salient. Furthermore, because of the "costless" nature of stock options, such that losses
are not incurred when stock prices decrease; a CEO's inhibition tendencies are likely to
be even further diminished. This in turn intensifies the acceptability of strategic risk
taking.
It is generally accepted by social psychologists that the approach behavioral system is
linked to inflated sensitivity to rewards (Carver & White, 1994; Smith & Bargh, 2008).
Therefore, relatively high-powered CEOs, who are already primed to be in an approach
mode, are even more likely to be focused on the potential rewards associated with their
stock options and the associated opportunities for influencing stock performance.
Relatedly, social psychology researchers have demonstrated that activation of the
approach behavior system by the experience of power also leads to greater positive affect
in individuals (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998), which in turn
facilitates heightened expectations and judgments about their level of effectiveness in
achieving successful outcomes (Erez & Isen, 2002).
In line with this reasoning, Becker (2006) empirically demonstrated that powerful
CEOs were more willing to have compensation that was largely comprised of stock
options. This implies powerful CEOs may expect they will be able to positively
influence stock prices, increasing the monetary rewards associated with their stock
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options. Dunford, Boswell, and Boudreau (2010) find that the higher a manager's
hierarchical level, or structural power, the more he or she believes they can influence the
firm's stock price. In sum, these studies suggest a complementary relationship between
CEO power and exercisable stock options on strategic risk taking.
Findings by Devers et al. (2008) with respect to the moderating effects of reloading
(i.e., awarding replacement options for those which had expired or been exercised) and/or
repricing (i.e., decreasing the exercise price) of a CEO's stock options by boards of
directors also lend support for complementary effects. Specifically, reloading and
repricing of stock options are shown to positively moderate the effect of stock options on
their measure of strategic risk taking (i.e., R&D spending, capital expenditures, and longterm debt). These types of board actions that increase CEO stock option wealth could
arguably be indicative of greater CEO power relative to the board, again suggesting
mutually reinforcing relationships. Taken together the presented arguments lead us to
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: CEO power and the accumulated value of his or her exercisable stock
options function as complements in explaining strategic risk taking, such that the
value of exercisable stock options positively moderates the relationship between CEO
power and strategic risk taking.

Interaction effects of CEO power and unexercisable stock options. The argument that
CEO power and unexercisable stock options function in a substitutive manner in eliciting
CEO strategic risk taking is based on the idea that CEOs possessing either significant
amounts of these type of options or high levels of power may be sufficiently biased
towards the gains and away from the losses that might accrue from risk taking. Therefore

the added effects of the other, contribute very little to influencing cognitive tendencies
towards taking risks.
Our logic for proposing that unexercisable stock options, representing future wealth,
will substitute for power in influencing how a CEO views the acceptability of strategic
risk taking is based on an established notion in psychology literature. Scholars from this
discipline (e.g., Bjorkman, 1984; Jones & Johnson, 1973; Wright & Weitz; 1977) have
long noted that the longer a decision maker has before experiencing the outcome or
consequences of risk taking, the more willing he or she will be to take risks. The relevant
outcome being, how the stock options' accumulated value changes in the future. As
Devers et al. (2008) argues, because the unexercisable options cannot be cashed in
(exercised) yet, CEOs do not endow the potential value into their current wealth
assessments. It is only at the time the options become exercisable, that CEOs consider
drops in stock prices to actually cause personal losses. Therefore, since unexercisable
stock option awards have on average three to five year vesting periods (Hall & Murphy,
2002; Souder & Shaver, 2010) the consequences of strategic risk taking on the value of
the CEO's unexercisable stock options, via stock price fluctuations, will occur in the
future.
Yates (1990) suggested that decision makers have less concerns with the downsides
of risk taking when the impact of such risk taking is further away because they believe
they can exert control over potential negative events. In the case of unexercisable stock
options, this would allow more time to increase stock price and/or rebound from drops in
the prices. Shepperd, Ouellette, and Fernandez (1996) demonstrate that individuals'
subjective confidence for achieving desired outcomes increases when the consequences
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are further into the future. In addition, a CEO with low power may perceive risk taking as
a way of enhancing his/her power position, and if he or she has stock options that will not
be exercisable until sometime in the future, any inhibition they may have due to their lack
of power, may be diminished by the fact that they still have time to take actions that will
allow the stock price to increase.
The tendency to accept more risk for decisions whose outcomes occur in the future is
consistent with the A/I theory of power, in that the concerns about the downsides (loss of
wealth) are mitigated, with focus on the potential upsides emphasized. Indeed, Nisan and
Minkowich (1973) found that decision makers actually perceived that the probability of
success was higher for outcomes that occurred in the future. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: CEO power and the accumulated value of his or her unexercisable
stock options function as substitutes in explaining strategic risk taking, such that the
accumulated value of unexercisable stock options negatively moderates the
relationship between CEO power and strategic risk taking.
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
2.3 METHODS
Sample and Data
The sample for testing our hypotheses is drawn from the firms listed on the Standard
& Poor's (S&P) 500, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap indices representing the 70 industries at
the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and 36 at the two digit SIC
code, for which Finkelstein et al. (2009: 29 - 30) reports discretion scores, so that we
may control for industry sources of discretion. After excluding financial firms (SIC 6021,

6022, 6035, 6141, 6211, 6411) since they often do not report investments (e.g., R&D)
used in our strategic risk measure and are subject to special regulations, as well as SIC
codes without firms reporting compensation data in the S&P's ExecuComp database, 61
industries at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and 32 at the two
digit SIC code are represented. We extracted information related to firm directors and
CEOs from 2003 to 2006 from the S&P's ExecuComp database and DEF14A Proxy
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Annual company
financial data came from the Reuters' Thomson One Financial and COMPUSTAT
database.
We chose to commence the study in the years after the implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (i.e., 2002), taking into account our lagged model structure, to filter
out any effects of the major institutional changes brought about by the passage of the act
(Haynes & Hillman, 2010), that may have impacted power, compensation, and/or risk
taking in corporate organizational settings. The time frame also precludes the years
constituting the global financial crisis (i.e., 2008 onwards) to further minimize
confounding effects. After merging and matching the data collected from the various
archival sources, the resulting panel data set consists of 1,574 CEO-year observations
which were associated with 500 different companies operating during the sample time
period.
Dependent Variable
Consistent with Sanders and Hambrick (2007), we used the summed aggregate of
three strategic investments considered to represent risky investments by previous
researchers in the extant literature (e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Hoskisson, Hitt,

47

& Hill, 1993) as the measure of strategic risk taking. The strategic investments used were
R&D investments, capital investments, and acquisition investments and were measured
as the total expenses for these categories as reported in Thomson One Financial and
COMPUSTAT databases.
Independent Variables
As suggested by Finkelstein et al. (2009) and exemplified by recent risk taking
research (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Tang et al.,
2011) we take into account that CEO power arises from multiple sources (Daily &
Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992). Therefore, we use several indicators representing the
various sources of formal and informal power as suggested by Finkelstein (1992) to
construct an index of CEO power.
Duality (coded 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board) is used to capture a CEO's
structural power (Adams et al., 2005). Duality has long been used as a proxy for
structural power, as it provides the CEO the opportunity to set meeting agenda's and play
a role in nominating outside directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Owning equity bestows voting rights and may increase a CEO's ability to influence
board strategic actions (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). CEO ownership power is a function
of the level of equity held by other directors as this may balance or even counteract the
effects of a CEO's ownership stake (Finkelstein, 1992). CEO ownership power is
represented by the ratio of CEO to board equity holdings of the focal firm (Haynes &
Hillman, 2010).
For a CEO's expert power, we use the proportion of board members appointed during
the CEO's tenure (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). The measure captures the degree of
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information asymmetry, as board members with less firm experience will be more likely
to rely upon the CEO for knowledge about strategic investments (Grabke-Rundell &
Gomez-Mejia, 2002).
Power has also been shown to accrue to CEOs due to their prestige (Daily & Johnson,
1997). CEOs with prestige power are often subject to less monitoring by outside directors
(Hengartner, 2006) as a CEO's prestigious image is associated with successful
leadership. Consistent with Adams et al., (2005) we include a dummy variable indicating
whether a CEO is a founder as this may also confer prestige power on the CEO
(Finkelstein, 1992).
To create the aggregate CEO power index, all of the CEO power variables were
standardized and summed together, similar to Haynes and Hillman (2010). Contrary to
the measure used by Haynes and Hillman (2010), our CEO power index includes founder
status of the CEO (to capture the possibility of prestige power) and excludes the ratio of
nonaffiliated to total number of directors, since we already have a measure representing
structural sources of power (duality), and in a factor analysis, this variable had very low
loadings compared to the other measures. However, we do include it as a control
variable.
CEO exercisable stock options and CEO unexercisable stock options are measured as
the natural log (to assure normality) of the accumulated cash value reported in the
ExecuComp database, that multiplies the average option spread (the market price of stock
options minus the exercise price) by the number of each type of options held (LarrazaKintana et al., 2007, Devers et al., 2008). All independent variables precede the
dependent variable by one year.
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Control Variables
Control variables measured at CEO, board, firm, and industry levels that could be
associated with CEO power, stock options and/or strategic risk taking were included to
rule out alternative explanations. Like the independent variables, control variables are
measured one year prior to the dependent variable.
A CEO's ownership stake in the firm has been shown to influence risk taking (Palmer
& Wiseman, 1999; Sanders, 2001) thus we controlled for the CEO's wealth associated
with his/her ownership in the firm measuring CEO ownership as the value of the CEO's
shareholdings excluding options (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) transformed into its natural
log to correct for skewness. We also control for the level of cash compensation,
measured as the natural log of the sum of cash salary and cash bonus variables in the
ExecuComp database (Devers et al., 2008). Cash compensation has been argued to offer a
level of protection against the uncertainties associated with equity based compensation
(e.g., Devers et al., 2008).
Risk aversion has been associated with gender and age in previous research
(MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986) therefore we include these variables, using a dummy
variable for CEO gender, coded as 1 for females and 0 for males. CEO age is the
difference between the study year and year of birth (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton
2000).
The literature suggests CEOs are sometimes fired/hired in order to institute strategic
change (Finkelstein et al., 2009), therefore we also control for whether the firm has a new
CEO by including a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO was hired within two years of
the focal year (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007). We also control for CEO tenure, the number
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of years he or she has held the CEO position, as researchers have theorized and
demonstrated that CEOs with long tenure are able to enhance their social and human
capital as they have had more opportunities to develop firm specific knowledge and
relationships with internal and external constituents (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007)
potentially increasing control over their boards (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
As CEO power is most often considered relative to the board of directors (Finkelstein
et al2009) we also include several board level control variables. Previous research on
the influence of board size has been mixed (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010) with
some studies suggesting larger boards are preferable as it provides an abundance of
directors offering expertise and counsel to the CEO (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson,
1998) while other studies (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) demonstrate that larger boards were
less involved with strategic decision making in firms. Board size is included as a control
variable, computed as the number of directors on the board.
We also include two other variables cited in the literature as being associated with
board involvement in the strategic decision making process. The proportion of non
executive directors to total number of directors was used to represent proportion of
outside directors (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). Non-executive directors are those who are
not current or past managers (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Outside directors' average
board tenure was measured as the total number of years served on the focal firm board by
each outside director divided by the total number of outside directors. This measure has
been used by researchers to portray the firm-specific human capital and experience of the
board which may influence how they monitor or advise the CEO on his or her risk taking
initiatives (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).
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We also include several firm level control variables. We control for prior firm
performance using total shareholder results (TSR) at t-1 (Deutsch et al., 2010; Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007). The use of return-on-assets (ROA) along with TSR or in place of did
not give different results. The prior year performance is included as CEO power (Daily &
Johnson, 1997) and risk-taking may be influenced by prior performance (Bromiley,
1991).
Organizational slack, both unabsorbed and potential has been shown to be associated
with risk-taking initiatives (Greve, 2003; Iyer & Miller, 2008). Thus, we measured
unabsorbed slack as the current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) and
potential slack, as the ratio of debt to equity (Deutsch et al., 2010; Iyer & Miller, 2008).
Firm size has been argued to affect a number of organizational outcomes (Porter,
1980) and in particular firm level risk taking (Audia & Greve, 2006) Firm Size was
operationalized as the natural log of sales to correct for skewness (Devers et al., 2008;
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). We also include firm age, as it may affect both CEO power
and risk taking behavior (Carpenter, et al., 2003). CEOs in older firms have been shown
to have less power resulting in a greater likelihood they may be removed (Fredrickson,
Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988). The age of a firm has also been shown to be positively
associated with the level of board involvement in strategic decision making (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992).
Clearly, industry context can also influence the strategic decision making process.
Therefore, we also controlled for industry discretion, specifically, we use the discretion
scores reported by Finkelstein et al. (2009: 29 -30) at the four-digit SIC code level. The
discretion scores were generated in a study by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) using a

panel of academic experts based on the industry determinants2 put forth by Hambrick and
Finkelstein (1987). Alternatively, we ran models with dummy variables for the 32 twodigit SIC codes and the results were similar to those we report using the discretion
scores 3 Finally, we also include year dummies to control for any differences across time
that could lead to the possibility of contemporaneous correlation, which is sometimes an
issue with panel data when the cross section variation is significantly larger than that
across time (Certo & Semadeni, 2006).
Statistical Analysis
The study uses panel data, (a pooled cross-sectional time series). With panel data, fixed
or random effects models are commonly used to avoid issues of heteroskedascity of error
terms and autocorrelations, which can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates when
ordinary least squares regression is used (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). Following previous
researchers studying similar strategic risk taking initiatives (e.g., Sanders & Hambrick,
2007; Deutsch et al., 2010) we employed cross sectional time series regression models
using generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with controls for autoregressive
autocorrelation, the "xtregar" command in ST ATA. We used random effects estimation
as our main interest was in explaining variance in strategic risk taking between firms and
"fixed effects estimation ignores the possibility that unit-to-unit variation sheds light on
the relationship between x and y. "(Worrall, 2008: 235) Also, the use of fixed effects
2 These

determinants include: product differentiability, market growth, demand
instability, capital intensity, industry structure (monopolistic or competitive), absence of
regulations and absence of powerful outside forces such as large concentrated buyers.
3 Only

one SIC code 2911 (Petroleum Refining) was found to have a significant effect.
Subsequent analysis without these firms did not change the reported results in any
significant manner.
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models precludes the use of time invariant variables, such as gender and industry
controls, which are theoretically justified for inclusion. Additionally, the Hausman (1978)
test indicated a lack of correlation (the chi-square statistic was not significant even at the
10% level) between the independent variables and the individual random effects
suggesting a random effects specification would be statistically appropriate. For testing
hypotheses examining the interactive effects of CEO power and exercisable and
unexercisable stock options, we mean centered the variables before forming the
interaction variables to reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity.
2.4 RESULTS
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, variance inflation factors (VIFs), and
correlations for the study variables. Significant correlations were found among some
variables, but as the mean VIF was 1.48 and the maximum value was 2.71 (CEO tenure),
all well below the conventional cutoff value of 10.00 (Ryan, 1997) and the more stringent
recommendation of 4.0 (O'Brien, 2007) we concluded multicollinearity was not an issue.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 reports the results of the random effects GLS estimation with controls for
autocorrelations. Model 1 examines the effects of the control variables. Firm size, board
size and CEO stock ownership levels had positive effects on strategic risk taking, and
these effects are seen consistently across the various models. Being CEO of a larger firm
or one with a large board, could arguably be a source of power, as is the level of
ownership in the firm, thus these results are compatible with the theoretical logic we put
forth.
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In model 2 we tested the three direct effects hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted CEO
power would be positively related to the level of strategic risk taking. The regression
coefficient for CEO power is positive and statistically significant (P = 0.08, p < .01)
indicating support for hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict the accumulated value of
exercisable and unexercisable stock options, respectively, are positively related to
strategic risk taking. Both were supported (P = 0.04, p < .05 for Hypothesis 2; P = 0.05, p
< .05 for Hypothesis 3). Notably, inclusion of these main effect variables also resulted in
a significant change in the overall model's Wald chi square.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In models 3 and 4, we tested our hypotheses concerning the interaction effects
between CEO power and the accumulated value of a CEO's exercisable (model 3) and
unexercisable stock options (model 4). The interaction term coefficient is positive and
significant (P = 0.05, p < .01) in model 3, indicating support for hypothesis 4 that CEO
power and the accumulated value of a CEO's exercisable stock options are fiinctioning as
complements. Figure 2 graphs the regression slope of the interaction effect that depicts
the change in strategic risk taking based on changes in CEO power for low and high
accumulated value of exercisable stock options. The slope is steeper, when the
accumulated value of exercisable stock options is high; indicating the effect of increasing
power is reinforced with higher levels of this type of stock option awards.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In model 4, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically
significant (P = -0.04, p < .05) indicating CEO power and the accumulated value of a
CEO's unexercisable stock options interact in a substitutive manner, supporting
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hypothesis 5. Figure 3, illustrates how the influence of CEO power on strategic risk
taking differs under low and high levels of unexercisable stock options. The slope of
power on strategic risk taking is greater when the value of unexercisable stock options is
low rather than high, demonstrating that having a higher value of unexercisable stock
options diminishes the influence of increasing CEO power on strategic risk taking. This
negative moderating effect is consistent with our hypothesis that power and unexercisable
stock options function as substitutes in explaining strategic risk taking variance.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
We further test the interaction hypotheses by entering the interaction effects jointly in
model 5. We find similar results to those in models 3 and 4. The interaction term for CEO
power and the accumulated value of exercisable stock options is significantly positive (P
= 0.05, p < .01) while the interaction term for CEO power and the accumulated value of
unexercisable stock options is again found to be negative and significant (p = -0.04, p <
.01). Evidence that the set of interaction terms account for significant residual variance in
the dependent variable is seen by a significant change in the Wald chi square statistics
between models 2 and 5 (p < .01).
We also examined whether there were nonlinear effects for our explanatory variables,
in particular, we wanted to ascertain, per theorizing by Devers et al. (2008), if
endowment effects appeared to be present at high levels of exercisable stock options. We
did not find any statistical evidence of curvilinear relationships. To further check the
robustness of our findings, we re-ran the estimations using other measures for stock
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options4 employed in compensation and risk taking studies and the results using these
alternative measures were very similar to the results of our reported models.
2.5 DISCUSSION
This study examined how CEO power and the accumulated value of CEO stock
options separately and interactively affect strategic risk taking. We found that CEO
power had a positive direct effect on our composite measure of strategic risk taking as did
the accumulated value of both exercisable and unexercisable CEO stock options. These
findings are consistent with our overall theoretical model, which proposed that CEO
power and the accumulated value of stock options influence a CEO's cognitive
processing such that s/he is focused predominantly towards potential upsides and away
from downsides associated with strategic risk taking, increasing the proclivity to engage
in such activities.
In exploring the interactive effects of CEO power and the accumulated value of
exercisable and of unexercisable stock options on the degree of risk taking, we
hypothesized and demonstrated empirically that CEO power significantly interacted with
both types of stock options, but in different ways. We found CEO power and the
accumulated value of exercisable stock options interact positively, suggesting they
function as complements in impacting the degree of strategic risk taking. Whereas the
interaction effect of CEO power and the accumulated value of unexercisable stock
4 Alternative

measures were: 1) value of exercisable and unexercisable stock options
granted to the CEO, where the values are based upon the standard Black and Scholes
option valuation calculations as reported in the Execucomp database (Deutsch et al.,
2011) and 2) the proportion of total compensation paid as stock options, where the value
is based upon the standard Black and Scholes option valuation calculations as reported in
the ExecuComp database (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).
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options was negatively related to strategic risk taking; supporting our hypothesis that
CEO power and this type of stock option function as substitutes.
Arguments for complementary effects focused on the notion that in combination the
cognitive framing effects of power and exercisable stock options are stronger than those
of either one separately. Exercisable stock options are those which can be cashed in at
any time, providing the holder (CEO) the ability to amass wealth immediately or at any
desired time, thus constituting part of a CEO's current wealth. As such, this may impart
feelings of power, further augmenting a CEO's focus on the upsides of risk taking. Also
if CEOs are concerned about possible losses (downsides) to the accumulated value of
exercisable stock options associated with risk taking ventures, the approach tendencies
activated by increasing power may counteract or diminish these concerns.
Our findings that CEO power and the accumulated value of unexercisable stock
options interact negatively, serving as substitutes for one another, suggest that each are
equally strong in influencing how a CEOs thinks about the acceptability of strategic risk
taking. Unexercisable stock options, as opposed to exercisable, are those which cannot be
cashed in immediately but rather at a date sometime in the future, thus representing future
wealth. We suggest that possessing these type of options will like power, as suggested by
A/I theory direct focus to upsides associated with risk taking and negate the downsides,
more so than exercisable ones. The arguments are consistent with research in psychology
that has shown that the longer a decision maker has to experience the outcome or
consequences of risk taking, the more willing he or she will be to take risks (Bjorkman,
1984).
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This research has several theoretical implications for the study of strategic risk taking,
CEO power, and CEO compensation. First, the conceptual model and empirical results
fill a gap in the literature. Past studies using the power construct as a predictor of
strategic choices have focused on how power predicts whose preferences will be exerted
not what the preferences are. By employing the A/I theory of power, we demonstrate that
rather than power merely providing the means by which CEOs are able to exert their
preferences, it also substantively motivates their risk preferences.
Indeed, theorizing and demonstrating empirically that strategic risk taking increases
with increasing CEO power is a direct challenge to agency theory logic, which argues
that CEOs, who are powerful relative to boards of directors, will be able to exert their
risk-averse preferences. While we do not reject the notion prevalent in the literature that
power provides CEOs the ability to exert their preferences (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988; Finkelstein, 1992), what we offer is a relatively new explanation for why the
preferences may be for taking not avoiding risky initiatives. By drawing from social
psychology's A/I theory of power our theorizing and supporting empirical results
contribute a plausible justification for why powerful CEOs may be inclined to undertake
strategic risks on behalf of their organizations. In so doing, we offer a theoretically based
alternative to the much critiqued (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998) pervasive agency theory assumption of risk averse managers.
The application of the A/I theory of power emphasizes that power, a fundamental
attribute of CEOs, alters their psychological and cognitive processes, and thus provides
an avenue for our work to add to the literature that stresses how cognitive schemas of
corporate executives affects their firm level risk taking (e.g., Chatteijee & Hambrick,
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2007; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Li & Tang, 2010). In particular, our study aligns with
recent work (e.g., Chng, Rodgers, Shih, & Song, 2012; Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012;
Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010) that stresses how
situational contingencies along with an individual executive's personality traits, impacts
how he or she responds to incentive compensation elements. The experience of power is
a common and important situational contingency within organizations,
By highlighting that having power and exercisable/unexercisable stock options
similarly influences the way CEOs perceive future outcomes of their strategic risk taking,
which then impacts how they act based on that understanding, we attempt to help fill gaps
in the literature about how cognitive framing by managers affects firm level phenomenon
(Fiol & Huff, 1992; Porac & Thomas, 2002). Furthermore, integrating the A/1 theory of
power with research on strategic risk taking, extends the theoretical boundaries of the
theory and in conjunction with our empirical support hopefully provides opportunities for
it to emerge as a viable means for further explaining, predicting and understanding how
individual cognitions may impact firm level phenomena.
Our findings that different types of stock options interact in dissimilar ways with
CEO power, to explain strategic risk taking, broadens previous research (e.g., Deutsch et
al., 2010; Devers et al., 2008; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) that has demonstrated that
stock option compensation is a significant determinant of strategic risk taking activities.
In particular, we extend the line of inquiry recently advanced by Devers et al. (2008) that
stresses the importance of considering the nuances of individual pay elements in eliciting
actions executives take on behalf of their organizations.
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Early strategy literature defined risk as income stream variance and found it to be
negatively related to performance (e.g., Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991). More recently,
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) theorize and demonstrate that increasing awards of CEO
stock options leads to more extreme performance, as CEO attention is focused
predominantly to the upside potential of risk taking (increasing their own personal wealth
via stock price increases) while practically ignoring the possible downsides, promoting
risk taking that leads to the high variability of performance. This is in the same vein as
our theorizing on the influence of power, and while our study does not examine the
performance outcomes or quality of risk taking that is induced by power, future studies
may want to consider whether risk taking encouraged by power leads to wise or unwise
risk taking decisions. Incorporating our findings with those of others emphasizing the
relevance of top managers' psychological traits (e.g., Chatteijee & Hambrick, 2007;
Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Li & Tang, 2010) could inform understanding of the boundary
conditions of when the exercise of power is used to undertake wise risks, versus
satisfying hubristic or even narcissistic tendencies.
Our study also has implications for practicing managers and boards of directors. Risk
taking is a key aspect of decision making with far-reaching performance ramifications,
ultimately determining whether a firm succeeds or fails. As the "levers of power are
uniquely concentrated in the hands of the CEO" (Nadler & Heilpern 1998: 9),
acknowledging that increases in power may lead to overly focusing on upside potential
associated with strategic risk taking may lead powerful CEOs to increase their
perspective taking. Specifically, it may motivate them to consider others' viewpoints on

the proposed risk taking initiatives, which may ultimately result in better overall
investment decisions benefitting a wide range of firm stakeholders.
Likewise, our research offers guidance to boards of directors as they undertake their
monitoring role and make decisions concerning compensation contracts of the CEO and
other powerful top executives. By understanding that individual elements of
compensation work jointly with the level of power afforded to the individual CEO,
boards could increase their effectiveness in carrying out their various responsibilities.
As with most research, our results should be viewed within the context of its
limitations, which also serves to highlight potential opportunities for future research. The
sample consists of U.S. firms that met data reporting criteria, thus possibly limiting
generalizability of the findings. As both risk taking and power may be understood and
enacted in very different ways in other national cultures (Zhong, Magee, Maddux, &
Galinsky, 2006) as well as legal environments (Brenner & Schwalbach, 2009), future
studies may provide additional insights by investigating how cultural differences in the
understanding, experience and exercising of power differentially influences risk taking by
non-Western corporate decision makers.
Despite our theoretical justification and precedence in the literature for focusing on
the CEO rather than other top management team members, consideration of other
powerful executives involved in firm level decision making offers opportunities for
future research. In addition, recent research has even found that middle managers level of
equity incentives influences firm risk taking and outcomes (Marler & Faugere, 2010).
We do note that the emphasis on the CEO did allow for consistency in the sample, as the

SEC disclosure rules require compensation reporting for the five highest paid executives,
which may represent different positions in the different firms.
While in line with other researchers (e.g., Greve, 2003; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999;
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) who have used actual strategic decisions as a proxy of
managerial risk taking, we recognize our use of the aggregated sum of R&D, capital, and
acquisition investments may limit the generalizability of our findings. The type of
decision may affect the power and risk taking relationship, thus future studies may wish
to consider different types of decisions.
Likewise, there are other proxies of CEO power or for a lack of CEO power which
might be considered from the A/I perspective in future research. For example, Carpenter
et al. (2003) find, contrary to their hypothesis that IPO firms who have directors
representing venture capitalist (VC) firms, exhibit less global risk seeking. The IPO
literature suggests the presence of VC directors serves as a governance mechanism as
they tend to be actively involved in monitoring of management and strategies and are
expected to encourage risk taking (Carpenter et al., 2003; Van den Berghe & Levrau,
2002). However, as firms with VC directors could be argued to have less powerful CEOs,
because of increased monitoring, and therefore reduced risk seeking by these firms, per
our theorizing, could be due to the lack of power accruing to these CEOs. Having low
power triggers the CEOs' behavioral inhibition system, resulting in a focus on threats and
therefore leads to diminished risk taking. Future studies could explore the consequences
of low power and/or the loss of power.
Similar to previous research we used a composite measure of CEO power, thus we
did not consider that some power dimensions may be more salient for motivating a focus
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on upsides. In a recent work, Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle (2012) find CEO expert and
ownership power are significantly associated with decision to specialize in risky
subprime mortgages. It would be interesting to consider not only how various sources of
CEO power directly impact risk taking but also how they interact with compensation
elements to influence undertaking risky ventures. Additionally, we suggest there may be
other social-psychological variables that might interact with power, like a CEO's level of
organizational identification (e.g., Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, 2011) offering
avenues for future inquiry.
As all of our measures came from archival data, we suggest research that can capture
a CEO's subjective perception of his or her level of power and riskiness of decisions
would add significantly to managerial risk taking knowledge. Additionally, the process
by which CEOs develop power is likely dynamic and iterative. Although quantitative
analyses of CEO power are appealing in that they can establish systematic relationships,
they are limited in their ability to capture the underlying mechanisms that connect power
and incentives with cognition such that it influences strategic risk taking. As such,
researchers employing qualitative methods may be able to further tease out the
underlying mechanisms connecting power and incentives with risk taking. Finer grained
analysis might also prove beneficial in helping future researchers address the question of
how powerful CEOs diffuse their risk taking proclivity throughout their firms.
Despite these limitations, this study provides new theoretical explanations and
empirical support for explaining strategic risk taking. Specifically, the current study has
provided theory and empirical results that indicates CEO power is an important
determinant of the level of strategic risk taking a CEO engages in on behalf of his or her
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firm. Having greater accumulated value of exercisable stock options appears to
complement the effect of CEO power in influencing the level of strategic risk taking.
Whereas, the accumulated value of unexercisable stock options seems to serve as a
substitute for focusing on the potential upsides of risk taking, increasing the proclivity to
engage in such activities. We think these results are important because they afford greater
flexibility to scholars interested in studying how corporate executives may differ in their
strategic risk taking because of their variation in how they cognitively assess the
anticipated outcomes of such initiatives. Thus our study provides an avenue for future
researcher to allow for the possibility that risk preferences of decision makers may vary
with respect to situational and organizational contingencies.
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CHAPTER 3
GOLD FOR NOW AND THE GOLDEN YEARS: THE INFLUENCE OF CEO
RETIREMENT PAY AND STOCK OPTIONS ON
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Cross border acquisitions have been and continue to be a popular strategy for firm
decision makers (Firstbook, 2008). In 2011 the global volume of mergers and
acquisitions was $2.54 trillion USD (Rusli, 2012). In recent years almost half of all
acquisitions made worldwide have been made across national borders (Firstbrook, 2008;
Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004) Cross-border acquisitions provide important
tangible and intangible assets as well as being arguably the quickest way to access a
large portion of international markets (Anand & Delios, 2002; Hitt & Pisano, 2003;
Shimizu et al., 2004).
Despite these trends, engaging in cross-border acquisitions is a strategy that entails
significant investment and commitment of firm resources prior to folly understanding the
potential performance outcomes, which may be positive or negative, and often result in
significant variance in returns (Hitt & Pisano, 2003; Lee & Caves, 1998; Lu & Beamish,
2004; Shrader, Oviatt, & McDougall, 2000; Shimizu et al., 2004). For this reason they
have been characterized as 'risky' decisions (e.g., Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003;
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Herrmann & Datta, 2006;
Matta & Beamish, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004; Shrader et al., 2000).
Along with the various positive and negative firm level outcomes associated with
acquisitions, CEOs also face the possibility of more direct personal outcomes. On the
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positive side, enlarging firm size by acquisitions has been shown to lead to permanent
increases in CEO compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li, 2007; Schmidt &
Fowler, 1990). Increasing the size and multi-nationality of firms are also associated with
greater prestige and visibility being conferred on the CEO (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). On
the negative side, CEOs making value destroying acquisitions may have a greater
likelihood of job loss (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Taken together, when a CEO chooses to
engage in cross-border acquisitions, he or she is exhibiting a willingness to engage in
significant risk taking.
A large body of interdisciplinary research has demonstrated CEO risk taking is
influenced by compensation elements (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007;
Haleblian et al., 2009). However, one element, retirement pay, which has been reported
to have increasing economic significance in compensation packages of U.S. CEOs
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2005; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, & Stuart, 2012; Edmans & Liu, 2011;
Silver-Greenberg, Kalwarski & Leondis, 2010) has been given minimal theoretical and
empirical attention by organizational scholars. This study attempts to begin to close the
gap in the literature by examining how the accumulated value of CEO retirement pay
influences risk taking, specifically the decision to engage in cross-border acquisitions.
In doing so, I draw from Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia's (1998) behavioral agency
model (BAM). In particular the notion that variance in risk bearing (perceived threats to
current wealth) exerts varying effects on decision makers' risk perceptions and ultimately
risk taking behavior. Specifically I argue that the accumulated value of CEOs' retirement
pay, which is comprised of pension and deferred compensation, reduces a CEO's risk
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bearing, which lessens CEOs' perceptions of downside risks associated with undertaking
risky investments such as cross border acquisitions.
There is a considerable body of research, primarily underpinned by agency theory
(O'Reilly & Main, 2010; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000) demonstrating that
equity holdings and in particular, stock options, influence decision making including
those associated with acquisition activity (e.g., Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Bodolica &
Spraggon, 2009; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Matta &
Beamish, 2008; Sanders, 2001; Wright, Kroll, & Elenkov, 2002).
Agency theory suggests CEOs tend to be less risk seeking than investors would prefer
because the current and potential wealth of a CEO is less diversified than that of
shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore by avoiding
risk taking on behalf of their firms CEOs reduce threats to their personal wealth. Agency
theory prescribes that compensation contracts be designed such that risk-averse CEOs
will be encouraged to make decisions on behalf of their firms in ways that will mitigate
the costs associated with this misalignment of interests and risk preferences (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Stock option awards, in particular have been suggested as a means of aligning risk
preferences (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As the payout from stock options is the difference
between the price the stock was awarded at and the current market price, the holder's
(e.g., CEO) personal wealth benefits when stock price increases; but because he/she has
not had to purchase ownership of the option, his/her personal wealth will not suffer if
stock price decreases. In other words, by taking firm-level risks a CEO's personal wealth
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has the potential to gain, but will be insulated from losses, thus decreasing his/her level of
risk bearing and increasing the acceptability of risk taking.
In contrast, researchers using a BAM approach, argue that 'in-the-money' stock
options, those with current market prices greater than grant prices, are instantly endowed
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990) into estimates of a CEO's current wealth. Together with the
assumption that CEOs, rather than being risk averse are loss averse, BAM reasoning
suggests a CEO's risk bearing increases as the accumulated value of his/her unexercised
stock options increases. Consequently, in order to protect that value CEOs will be less
likely to engage in risk taking on behalf of their firms. Empirical results have been
mixed showing both positive (Chen, Steiner, & Whyte, 2006; Wu & Tu, 2007) and
negative (e.g., Larraza-Kintanna et al., 2007; Sawers, Wright, & Zamora, 2011)
associations between the value of unexercised in-the money stock options and risk taking.
In the current analysis in the context of cross-border acquisitions and CEO pay, it is
theorized, contrary to the BAM that CEOs will not instantly endow the wealth associated
with future increases in stock prices. Theoretical arguments are developed based on
previous stock option - acquisition research, findings about stock price expectancy effects
(Dunford, Boswell,& Boudreau, 2010) and the tendency for decision makers to accept
more risk for decisions whose outcomes occur in the future (Shepperd, Ouellette, &
Fernandez, 1996; Yates, 1990)
Since the risk taking by the CEO is on behalf of his/her organization, in order for the
CEO's motivation to engage in cross-border acquisitions to manifest as action, he or she
must have the discretion, or latitude of action (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) to enact
this motivation. Therefore, I also hypothesize that the strength of the relationships
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between the studied compensation elements and strategic risk taking will be strengthened
when CEOs have greater discretion as compared to CEOs possessing less discretion.
In summary, as the study is among the first to examine the effect CEO retirement pay
may have on corporate strategic decisions, it contributes insights to both the executive
compensation and strategic risk taking literature, in particular that associated with crossborder acquisition research. Testing of the hypotheses grounded in the BAM contributes
to expanding the applicability of this theoretical perspective, by demonstrating how CEO
retirement pay along with in-the-money stock options influences risk bearing, and
ultimately risk taking choices. The study also extends the BAM by explicating the role of
managerial discretion arising from the industry context and organizational sources in
moderating the outcomes associated with CEO compensation influenced risk taking.
The theoretical model is tested in a longitudinal sample from 2006 - 2011 of U.S.
public companies operating in four industries with differing levels of industry discretion.
Results indicate that both CEO in-the-money stock options and retirement pay are
positively related to cross-border acquisition activity. The findings also demonstrate that
managerial discretion, arising from the firm's external industry context and internal
organizational leadership structure accentuate the relationship between the value of CEO
in-the-money stock options and cross-border acquisition activity.
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Cross boarder acquisitions provide tangible resources (e.g., manufacturing facilities,
distribution channels) and important intangible assets (e.g., employees with local
knowledge and relationships) as well as being arguably the quickest way to access a large
portion of international markets. However it is a strategy that comes with challenges that
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reflect the riskiness scholars have ascribed to this strategy (Hitt & Pisano, 2003; Matta &
Beamish, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004)
Acquisitions tend to require significant commitment of firm resources and are
associated with high switching/exit costs (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). Foreign
environments pose unique and complex challenges to acquiring firms before during and
after taking ownership. Negotiating agreements in accordance with host country legal and
regulatory requirements may be problematic as well as obtaining accurate assessments of
target value due to increased information asymmetry (Reuer & Koza, 2000) increasing
the costs associated with the acquisition (Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009). Acquiring
firms immediately have decision-making responsibility in the context of not only a
differing corporate culture but also national culture, which may encompass drastically
different social norms and practices (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). With respect to
announcement period returns, empirical studies have failed to reach consensus, with
some studies indicating shareholders of acquiring firms benefit (e.g., Morck & Yeung,
1991, 1992; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991) while other studies have reported negative or
insignificant value creation for acquiring firm shareholders (e.g., Datta & Piua, 1995;
Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002; Eckbo & Thournburn, 2000).
In sum, previous research demonstrates cross-border acquisition activity may increase
uncertainty concerning future income returns, hold the possibility of large losses or gains
occurring, as well as threaten or enhance short-term market returns (Carpenter, Pollock,
& Leary, 2003; Hitt & Pisano, 2003; Shimizu et al., 2004; Shrader et al., 2000). Along
with the various positive and negative firm level outcomes associated with acquisitions,
CEOs also face the possibility of more direct personal outcomes. From a positive

standpoint enlarging firm size by acquisitions has been shown to lead to permanent
increases in CEO compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li, 2007; Schmidt &
Fowler, 1990). Increasing the size and multi-nationality of firms are also associated with
greater prestige and visibility being conferred on the CEO (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). On
the negative side, a study by Lehn and Zhao (2006) found evidence that CEOs of U.S.
firms making value destroying acquisitions from 1990 - 1998 had a greater likelihood of
job loss.
Taken altogether, when a CEO chooses to engage in cross-border acquisitions, he or
she is exhibiting a willingness to engage in risk taking. However, from a traditional
agency theory perspective, based on the potential divergence of interests when ownership
and control of a firm are separate, CEOs in order to shield their non-diversifiable human
capital are assumed to be more risk averse than shareholders would prefer (Amihud &
Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Based on the assumption of a
risk return correlation, i.e., bigger risks increase the chance for bigger returns (Fama,
1976) shareholders are assumed to be risk neutral as they are able to hold portfolios of
equity from an assortment of firms and therefore are able to diversify away firm-specific
risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory prescribes rectifying this agency problem by
designing and implementing incentives to "alter the risk orientation of agents to align
them with the interests of the principals" (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 133).
This has led to advocating in theory and in practice, for the use of equity based
compensation as a means of achieving risk alignment by essentially making managers
shareholders. However scholars have discerned that research examining relationships
between various equity compensation elements and acquisition activity have produced
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mixed findings (Devers et aL, 2007; Haleblian et al., 2009; Sanders, 2001; Sanders and
Hambrick, 2007). Divergent findings for the different equity based compensation
elements have been explained by drawing from the BAM, which asserts decision makers
perceive different types of compensation have different risk characteristics (Devers et al.,
2008; Sanders, 2001; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
The BAM, integrating premises from agency and prospect theories (Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) presents risk taking as a function of problem framing and risk
bearing, both of which are may be differentially influenced by elements of compensation.
The incorporation of problem framing from prospect theory changes the underlying
agency theory assumption that managers have stable risk averse preferences to the notion
that managers are loss averse. Loss averse CEOs are expected to have a greater
sensitivity to decreases in wealth rather than to gains in wealth (Wiseman & GomezMejia, 1998). The notion of risk bearing, refers to perceived threats to current and future
wealth (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and in the BAM, lower risk bearing would
increase the likelihood that CEOs would be more willing to engage in risk taking.
The logic is complementary to theorizing put forth by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) in their
model of risky decision-making and later extended to acquisition decisions by Pablo,
Sitkin, and Jemison (1996). These scholars stress the role decision makers' risk
perceptions play in determining whether risk taking is deemed acceptable and thus
undertaken. Pablo et al. (1996:725) theorize in the context of acquisition decisions, risk
perceptions channel "such major cognitive processes as information gathering and sensemaking" that subsequently impact the choices made. If a CEO perceives the riskiness of a
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cross-border acquisition is lower, or less likely to result in losses, he or she will be more
likely undertake it.
In Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia's (1998) conceptualization of the BAM they explicitly
consider the different influences of base pay and performance contingent pay on risk
bearing (perceived threats to wealth) and thus risk taking. While they do not consider
how retirement pay would fit into the framework, I suggest these elements will have
implications for risk bearing and therefore perceptions of the risk associated with
strategic choices, which will ultimately impact whether cross-border acquisitions are
undertaken.
Retirement Pay and Cross-border Acquisitions
The accumulated value of U.S. CEOs' retirement pay, comprised of pensions and often
deferred compensation contributions, has been shown to represent vast amounts of wealth
and to have increasing significance in their compensation packages (Bebchuk & Fried,
2005; Sundaram & Yermack, 2007). In a study of 237 Fortune 500 firms over the period
from 1996 to 2002, Sundaram & Yermack (2007) found the pension value for CEOs
averaged $4.2 million. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) report that 51 departing CEOs of
S&P 500 firms during 2003 and the first 6 months of 2004 left with pensions that were on
average equivalent to 44% of the total compensation (including equity portions) they
earned during their tenure as CEO. More recently, Bloomberg BusinessWeek in an
examination of 81 firms in the S&P 500-stock index found that in 2009, pensions were
the fastest growing compensation category for CEOs, increasing an average of 15.4
percent or $1.3 million USD annually (Silver-Greenberg, Kalwarski, & Leondis, 2010).
Despite the size and ubiquity of these compensation arrangements, they have received
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minimal theoretical and empirical attention in the literature (Cassell et al., 2012;
Sundaram & Yermack, 2007).
CEO pensions often provide life annuities that are worth upwards of 60 percent of
final average salary plus bonus (Sundaram & Yermack, 2007) and when coupled with
deferred compensation contributions comprise a significant level of wealth that a firm
promises to provide the CEO when he/she retires (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). Because
CEO pensions are typically well above the maximum amount that is federally insured,
they are referred to as supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) (Sundaram
&Yermack, 2007). SERPs represent a fixed cash portion of compensation that will be
paid to the CEO in the future regardless of firm performance, and will only be at risk for
non-payment if the firm goes bankrupt as it will be treated just like any other obligation
to a creditor (Edmans & Liu, 2010).
Retirement pay is somewhat analogous to the BAM concept of base pay, in that
unlike performance contingent pay, it is less uncertain, as it is often specified as part of
the compensation contract. However, unlike base pay, it will not be at threat for loss if
the CEO's employment ends voluntarily or for poor performance. A recent anecdotal
report from the business press offers a striking illustration:
Ken Lewis doesn't have a golden parachute, but he's all set for a comfortable landing
— unlike his long-suffering shareholders. The Bank of America chief executive officer
said Wednesday he'll step aside at year-end after eight years at the helm. Based on
the company's most recent proxy statement, he will have $53 million in pension
benefits waiting for him when he leaves. That should give him about $3.5 million a
year in pension payouts for the rest of his life — at a time when people who bought the
stock when he took the reins in 200J are underwater on their investments. (Barr,
2009)

Therefore unlike other compensation elements, retirement pay is a form of CEO wealth
that is highly insulated from threats of loss suggesting reduced risk bearing, which
according to the BAM should make CEOs more willing to take risks.
As discussed previously, cross-border acquisitions offer the possibility for upsides
and downsides at both the firm and individual level. Following increases in firm size and
international scope, CEOs often experience permanent increases to their cash
compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), therefore, an
acquisition may very well be perceived as a means for achieving gains to not only current
compensation but also retirement pay. If a CEO is focused on the upsides, perceiving
these are more likely to occur than downsides, he or she is more likely to conclude
undertaking the risky strategic choice is warranted (Shapira, 1995). Having large values
of accumulated retirement pay may deflect the focus off the possible downsides,
providing a CEO with a sense of having a safety net for minimizing any personal wealth
losses if the acquisition outcomes are not successful. Therefore even if downsides occur
for other stakeholders, large values of accumulated retirement pay provide assurance to
CEOs that their risk bearing will be minimal.
The logic is similar to that used to explain the implications of compensation
protection devices, such as severance packages and golden parachutes, which have been
shown to motivate risk taking behavior with respect to acquisitions (Bodolica &
Spraggon, 2009). Having the guarantee of retirement pay may diminish perceptions of
uncertainty and/or extreme personal wealth losses resulting in the CEO feeling a sense of
control over possible outcomes associated with an acquisition. When CEOs feel a sense
of control over possible outcomes, they are likely to perceive lower levels of acquisition

risk and therefore have an even greater willingness to undertake acquisitions (Pablo et al.,
1996). Therefore, based on the theoretical arguments put forth, I predict that the greater
the level of retirement pay, the lower a CEO's perception of risk bearing and this in turn
leads to increases in acquisition activities.
Hypothesis 1: CEO retirement pay is positively related to firm cross-border
acquisition activity.
CEO Stock Options and Cross-border Acquisition
Acquisitions are risky investments that often result in significant variance in market
returns (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). The value or future pay-out of accumulated retirement
pay is not tied to how the market reacts to such strategies, however CEO stock options,
could be dramatically affected by acquisitions. Stock options are contracts that grant
shares at a certain price and after a period of time, the "vesting period", allow the
recipient to choose when he or she wishes to exercise, i.e., sell the stock at the current
market price (Hall & Murphy, 2002). If the current market price is greater than the grant
price, the options are said to be in-the-money, and by exercising the options, there will be
a monetary gain to the holder. Undertaking risky investments such as acquisitions is
desirable based on the logic that increasing risk offers the possibility of a wider variance
of returns both positive and negative (Fama,1976).
Agency theory predicts awarding equity type bonuses should incentivize managers to
take risks in order to increase stock price and thus their own personal wealth. Stock
options in particular have been suggested as an effective means for impacting CEOs'
willingness to engage in riskier ventures, since "CEOs are assumed to perceive limited
downside risk" (Devers et al, 2008:551) because he/she has not had to purchase
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ownership of the option and therefore no losses are incurred if stock price decreases. In
other words, by taking firm-level risks a CEO's personal wealth has the potential to gain,
but will be insulated from losses, thus decreasing his/her level of risk bearing and
increasing the acceptability of risk taking.
Similar to CEO retirement pay, fluctuations in stock prices or other unsuccessful
outcomes due to acquisition activity offer limited threat to a CEO's current wealth.
Furthermore, researchers (e.g., Harford & Li, 2007) have shown that even when
acquisitions turn out poorly CEOs are awarded with higher compensation and equity
awards. Additionally, if the firm's stock is performing poorly, the awarding of stock
options at lower prices, offers CEOs the potential for large pay-offs in future years if and
when the stock price rebounds. Recent reports in the business press, attest to how this
situation might occur:
CEOs saw the estimated future value of stock and options awards take off in 2010,
with the median value gaining 32% to $5.6 million. These stock holdings and options,
many of which were granted when stock prices were much lower than they are now,
stand to create a shower of wealth when CEOs cash them in. (Krantz & Hansen,
2011).

Using BAM logic associated with risk bearing and loss aversion, I argue that stock
options impose minimal risk bearing on CEOs, thus minimizing concerns about possible
losses and focusing attention on potential gains. In the case of cross-border acquisitions,
CEOs with significant stock options awards have significant incentive to focus on the
possible gains to their personal wealth. The gains the CEO is motivated to pursue may be
associated with positive firm level outcomes or be related to more direct personal
outcomes, such as increasing his/her compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li,
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2007; Schmidt & Fowler, 1990) or achieving greater prestige and visibility (Jensen &
Murphy, 1990).
Empirical studies have shown stock options do indeed encourage risk taking (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2006; Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2010; Devers et al.,
2007; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Williams & Rao, Wright et al., 2007), including
engaging in acquisition activity (e.g., Datta, Iskander-Datta,& Raman, 2001; Sanders,
2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Datta, Iskander-Datta, and Raman (2001) found
empirical evidence that CEO stock option compensation was positively associated with
the acquisition of high growth targets. Sanders (2001) demonstrated a positive
relationship between the value of stock options granted during a given year and the
number of acquisitions undertaken. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) in their analysis found
CEOs with high proportions of stock option pay to total compensation engaged in
significantly more acquisitions than CEOs who had low levels of stock options in their
compensation packages. With respect to in-the-money stock options, Malemendler and
Tate (2008) demonstrate a significant positive association between the value of
exercisable stock options held by a CEO and the firm's domestic acquisition activity.
While some BAM researchers (e.g., Devers, et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al.,
2007) have argued that CEOs may actually consider in-the-money stock options as part
of their endowed wealth and therefore view taking risks on behalf of their firms as
increasing their risk bearing (i.e., perceived threats to current wealth), the empirical
evidence has been minimal. Devers et al. (2008) disaggregates in-the-money stock
options into exercisable (those which are vested and therefore can be cashed in) and
unexercisable (not vested) and hypothesizes an inverted U-shape relationship between the
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value of exercisable options and strategic risk taking. The empirical analysis showed
significant positive associations between both exercisable and unexercisable options with
the combined strategic risk taking activities of R&D investments, capital expenditures,
and long term debt levels. The exercisable options and strategic risk taking relationship
was shown to become insignificant at higher levels rather than significantly dropping off.
Larraza-Kintana et al., (2008) in a sample of firms that recently underwent an IPO, do
find that the value of in-the-money stock options is negatively related to a survey
measure of CEO risk taking. Their results support the BAM premise that CEOs endow
the value of stock option gains into estimates of current wealth, however, due to the
particular importance of stock options in compensation packages of IPO firm CEOs
(Certo, Daily, Cannella, & DaltoN, 2003), these results may not be as readily applicable
to more established firms.
In addition, acquisition investments are likely to be a form of strategic risk taking that
a CEO perceives as having a salient causal impact on stock price (Shleifer & Vishny,
2003) again leading to a focus on upside potential for gain. Dunford, Boswell, and
Boudreau (2010) find that the higher a manager's hierarchical level, the more he or she
believes they can influence the firm's stock price. As the CEO is at the apex of the
organization, these findings suggest he/she may have a particularly strong belief of their
ability to influence stock prices by their strategic actions. Furthermore, because the stock
options are in-the-money, it is an indication that the stock price has indeed risen since
they were awarded; CEOs may experience over-confidence or hubris with respect to their
abilities to further increase stock prices (Devers et al., 2008). Hubris has been shown to
lead to increased risk taking (e.g., Li & Tang, 2010; Simon & Houghton, 2003) including

that associated with acquisition activities (Hayward & Hambrick, 2005; Malmendier &
Tate, 2006; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000)
Finally, Matta & Beamish (2008), while not hypothesizing a direct effect of the
value of CEO in-the-money stock options, find in their empirical analysis a significant
positive relationship between in-the-money stock options and the likelihood that a firm
engaged in a cross-border acquisition (Dichotomous dependent variable). In sum, based
on stock options having low risk bearing attributes and the prevailing supportive
empirical evidence with respect to risk taking, higher levels of in-the-money stock option
holdings by the CEO are expected to be associated with higher levels of cross-border
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 2: CEO in-the-money stock options are positively related to firm crossborder acquisition activity.
Moderating Effects of Managerial Discretion
I have theorized that as a CEO's accumulated value of retirement pay and in-the-money
stock options increases, so does the preference for and likelihood of engaging in crossborder acquisitions. Implicit in the theoretical logic is that the CEO will not be
constrained in acting upon his/her preference. This "absence of constraint" assumes that
the CEO will have the discretion to act, which may or may not be the case (Hambrick,
2007: 335).
Indeed, managerial discretion has been theorized to play a role in determining the
extent to which biases and cognitions of top executives affect organizational outcomes
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Discretion is derived from how much the external
environmental factors, conceptualized primarily in terms of industry characteristics
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(Boyd & Gove, 2006; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011) permit variety in courses of action
or how much the CEO is able to perceive "multiple courses of action" and the extent to
which the organization "empowers the chief executive to formulate and execute those
actions" (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987:379). Therefore, it is expected that depending
on the level of discretion a CEO has, the motivating influence of retirement pay and stock
options will be lessened or strengthened. Thus, contingent effects of managerial
discretion arising from industry and organizational sources are considered.
Industry discretion. The level of CEO discretion has been shown to vary across
industries (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick &
Abrahamson, 1995) as the extent to which variety and change are permitted or
constrained in different industries varies (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Hambrick and
Abrahamson (1995) used an expert panel comprised of securities analysts and academics
to rate the degree of managerial discretion in several (17) industries based on
determinants, which included product differentiability, market growth, demand
instability, capital intensity, industry structure (monopolistic or competitive), absence of
regulations and absence of powerful outside forces such as large concentrated buyers.
They found a high level of consistency and reliability among the experts' ratings.
Subsequently they ran regressions of the ratings on observable archival characteristics
associated with the industries and using the regression coefficients estimated weights for
the various characteristics in order to generate discretion scores for additional industries.
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) used these scores to categorize industries as
low-discretion or high-discretion in order to test whether the level of industry discretion
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influenced the relationship between CEO power and stock return variability. Their results
indicated CEOs impacted stock return variability more in high discretion industries.
In high discretion industries, CEOs face few restrictions and have greater latitude for
maneuvering (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) thus they are likely to have greater
influence over decision choices, such as engaging in cross-border acquisitions. It is also
likely that they will perceive that they will be able to exert greater control in postacquisition strategy such that the acquisition will positively influence firm outcomes
(e.g., stock returns). In industries where CEOs have a relatively high degree of discretion
they will have a greater ability to act upon their proclivity to engage in cross-border
acquisition activity because they possess the freedom to do so. In line with these
arguments, I put forth the following:
Hypothesis 3a: Industry discretion strengthens the positive relationship between
CEO retirement pay and firm cross-border acquisition activity.

Hypothesis 3b: Industry discretion strengthens the positive relationship between CEO
in-the-money stock option holdings and firm cross-border acquisition activity.

Organizational discretion/CEO duality. Managerial discretion has also been theorized
to arise from organizational sources (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) such as internal
slack and power relationships, though empirical analysis has been much more limited in
evaluating this aspect of managerial discretion (Boyd & Gove, 2006). An important
source of organizational discretion or a means by which a CEO is empowered to advance
his/her preferences, is serving as the firm's chair of the board of directors (Finkelstein &
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D'Aveni, 1994; Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986; Li & Tang, 2010). This dual leadership
structure affects power relationships with respect to strategic decision making and affords
the CEO a great deal of discretion when it comes to decisions concerning the firm
(Mallette & Fowler, 1992).
CEO duality, holding both the CEO and board chair titles, imparts significant
opportunity to exert political power (Finkelstein, 1992). In the role of board chair, the
CEO is given authority to set meeting agendas thus significantly influencing what issues
and decisions the board pays attention to (Finkelstein, 1992). In addition, the monitoring
of strategic decisions by the board has been shown to be less when a CEO also serves as
chair of the board (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Mizruchi, 1983). Less monitoring
indicates the CEO will have more resistance to exerting his/her preferences for engaging
in particular strategic activities such as cross-border acquisitions.
Empirical support for the moderating discretion effect of CEO duality is provided by
Li and Tang (2010) who find that CEO duality strengthened the effect of CEO hubristic
tendencies on firm level risk taking in a sample of Chinese CEOs. In sum, CEOs who
have high levels of stock options and/or retirement pay, and who also serves as their
firm's chair, will not only have greater motivations to engage in increased cross-border
acquisition activity, but will also have greater means, because they possess the latitude of
action to do so. Hence, the following moderating relationships are expected:
Hypothesis 4a: CEO Duality strengthens the positive relationship between CEO
retirement pay and firm cross-border acquisition activity.
Hypothesis 4b: CEO Duality strengthens the positive relationship between CEO inthe-money stock option holdings and firm cross-border acquisition activity.
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Figure 4 summarizes the hypothesized relationships.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
3.3 METHODS
Sample and Data
The sample for this study is drawn from U.S. public companies operating between 2006
and 2011 in four different industry classifications, oil and gas (NAICS 211-, 213-), paper
and packaging (NAICS 322-), aerospace and defense (NAICS 336- and 334-), and
telecommunications (NAICS 517-) with CEO compensation data available on S&P's
ExecuComp database. The industries selected have experienced significant worldwide
acquisition activity in recent years (e.g., Dalziel, 2008; Datamonitor, 2011; McAdam,
O'Hare, & Moffett, 2008; Misund, Asche & Osmundsen, 2008; Zarb & Noth, 2012)
suggesting engaging in cross-border acquisitions would represent significant strategic
decisions for the CEOs of the sample firms (DePamphilis, 2009). In addition, the four
industry classifications chosen represent differing levels of industry discretion, either low
(oil and gas), medium-low (paper and packaging), medium-high (aerospace and defense)
or high (telecommunications), based on Hambrick and Abrahamson's (1995) analysis for
which Finkelstein et al. (2009: 29-30) report discretion scores. This allows for
adequately testing the moderating role of industry discretion. The time period chosen
coincides with the effective date (December 31, 2006) of the SEC requiring that defined
benefit pensions and deferred compensation information be reported in proxy statements
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2006).
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable cross-border acquisition activity was measured as the number
of cross-border acquisitions completed by a firm during each of the years from 2007 to
2011 (Gao, 2010; (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Nadolska & Barkema,
2007; Sanders, 2001). The justification for using the number of acquisitions completed
rather than the value of the transaction is similar to that given by Sanders (2001). The
theory being tested is concerned with the amount of activity associated with or frequency
of cross-border acquisitions, thus the use of a count measure is in alignment with the
theoretical framework and previous empirical research. Also, the transaction value is
often not reported in the merger and acquisition databases, thus those observations
without values would not be used in the analysis. Additionally using reported transaction
values may result in a bias towards large value acquisitions. Data on acquisitions was
collected from the Thomson One Financial Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions
database. Cross-border acquisitions are defined as those involving an acquirer firm and a
target firm whose headquarters are located in different home countries. (Shimizu et al.,
2004) and where the acquiring firm obtains a controlling interest in another firm (Hitt et
al., 1996; Sanders, 2001).
Independent Variables
CEO retirement pay is the natural logarithm (to correct for its skewed distribution) of
the aggregate actuarial present value of the CEO's accumulated pension benefit plus the
aggregate balance in deferred compensation plans at the end of the year as reported in the
ExecuComp database (Cassell et al., 2012). All independent variables are lagged one
year, thus data is collected for these variables from 2006 to 2010.
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CEO in-the-money stock options is measured consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Devers et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007) as the accumulated value of exercisable
and unexercisable stock options based on variables reported in the ExecuComp database.
The natural logarithm of the variable is used to meet normality assumptions.
Industry discretion is measured as the mean value of the discretion scores reported
by Finkelstein et al. (2009: 29 -30) at the four-digit SIC code (if reported) or the two-digit
level that encompassed each industry classification. The discretion scores were generated
in a study by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) using a panel of academic experts based
on the industry determinants put forth by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987). Models were
also run using a procedure similar to that of Adams et al., (2005), whereby, the sample of
firms was split into high and low discretion and using a dummy variable coded 1 for
high-discretion and 0 for low-discretion and also using dummy variables for each
industry classification (e.g., each three-digit NAICS code). The results were similar to
those reported using the discretion scores, therefore the use of the more fine-grained
measure was chosen for testing the moderating hypotheses.
CEO duality is a dichotomous variable created by coding 0 for separated CEO and
board chairperson roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chairperson role as is commonly
done by management researchers (e.g., Boyd, 1995).
Control variables
Control variables that could be associated with CEO compensation arrangements,
managerial discretion and/or the decision to engage in cross-border acquisitions are
incorporated into the models to rule out alternative explanations.
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CEO equity ownership is measured as the value of the CEO's ownership of shares
excluding stock options. CEO equity ownership has been shown to be both negatively
related to acquisition activity (e.g., Sanders, 2001) as well as positively related (e.g.,
Wright, Kroll, Lado & Van Ness, 2002). The value of the CEO's ownership of shares is
calculated as the product of the number of stock shares that a CEO holds and closing
price in the previous fiscal year (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Wu & Tu, 2007). Ownership
data comes from the ExecuComp database and year end share prices from Thomson One
Financial databases.
CEO cash compensation measured as the natural log of salary and bonus as reported
in the ExecuComp database, is also included (Devers et al., 2008; Matta & Beamish,
2008). This element of pay tends to be paid rather reliably over time compared to equity
incentives, and from a BAM perspective (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) managers
are likely to endow their anticipated essential pay into their current wealth assessment
(Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). The pay is considered essential as it is relied upon to cover
ongoing living expenses and therefore not receiving merit and/or inflation increases are
likely to be viewed as losses and not merely as a non-gain, since adjustments to standards
of living may have to be made (Larraza-Kintana, et al., 2007). Therefore it may impact
CEO risk bearing.
CEO age has been shown to be negatively associated with firm internationalization
(e.g., Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). The age of a CEO may also impact
his/her level of retirement pay. CEO age was determined from the year of birth given in
the ExecuComp database and is the difference between the study year and year of birth.
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Several firm level control variables shown in previous research to be related to CEO
compensation and/or acquisition activity are also included. Firm age is included as CEOs
in older firms may have less discretion due to increased organizational inertia (Tushman
& Romanelli, 1985). It is computed as the number of years from founding to the study
year.
Firm size has been shown to be positively related to the level of CEO compensation
as well as structure of compensation contracts (Devers et al., 2007; Sanders & Carpenter,
1998). Firm size may be indicative of having enough resources to engage in acquisitions
as well as being negatively associated due to strategic inertia (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). The natural log of annual sales were used as a measure of firm size (Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007; Sanders, 2001)
Prior firm performance may influence how much a CEO is paid in various elements
of compensation (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) and poor performing firms have been
shown to undertake changes in corporate strategy as a means of improving performance
(Greve, 2003). On the other hand, poor performance may also constrain the firm from
acquisition activity due to a lack of financial resources (Barney, 1991). Prior firm
performance is measured using total shareholder results (TSR) (Deutsch et al., 2010;
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). The use of return-on-assets (ROA) along with TSR or in
place of did not give different results. Firm financial data is obtained from Thomson One
Financial database.
The international experience of the firm has also been shown to influence crossborder acquisition activity positively (Harzing, 2002). Following previous researchers,
this is measured as the percent of total firm sales that are generated outside the U.S. in the
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prior year and labeled as foreign sales (Doukas & Kan, 2006; Matta & Beamish, 2008).
The annual data comes from Mergent Online database.
The number of domestic acquisitions the firm undertook (Nadolska & Barkema,
2007) is included as a control variable, as this may impact the resources and experience
needed to engage in cross-border acquisitions. Engaging in domestic acquisitions may
occupy resources that are needed for cross-border acquisitions or the experience gained in
these types of acquisitions may provide added confidence for being successful with
further acquisitions (Hayward, 2002).
Also, dummy variables for each calendar year (year t) in the study were included to
control for any differences across time that could lead to the possibility of
contemporaneous correlation, which is sometimes an issue with panel data when the
cross section variation is significantly larger than that across time (Certo & Semadeni,
2006). As with the explanatory independent variables, all control variables are lagged
one year, with data collected from 2006 to 2010.
Statistical Analysis
As the dependent variable cross-border acquisition activity is a count variable taking
integer values greater than or equal to zero in a given year, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression techniques are inappropriate as the assumption of homoscedastic, normally
distributed error terms is violated. Often in this situation Poisson regression is used as the
estimation technique (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). However, Poisson models
carry the assumption that observations occur at fixed rates over the time period of
interest, and that the mean and variance are equal (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984).
To address this statistical issue, following the example of other acquisition studies (e.g.,
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Boeh, 2011; Nadolska & Barkema, 2007; Sanders, 2001) negative binomial regression is
used. This analytical technique allows the rate to vary across observations and is most
appropriate for dealing with over-dispersion problems that often arise with count
dependent variables (Hausman et al., 1984; Sanders, 2001)
Because the data consists of multiple years of observation for most firms, there is a
need to avoid correlated error terms, understated standard errors, and inflated t-statistics
(Beck & Katz, 1995). Therefore the ST ATA xtnbreg command is used. The Hausman
(1978) specification test, checking for correlation between the independent variables and
the individual random effects, was run to determine whether a fixed or random effects
model would be most appropriate. Lack of significant correlation indicates random
effects should be used, and if correlation exists, a fixed effects model should be
estimated. For all of the models, the chi-square statistic for the Hausman test is not
significant even at the 10 percent level, thus indicating that the random-effects model
adequately characterizes the relationships. In addition, unlike the fixed-effects regression,
the random-effects estimation allows the inclusion of time invariant variables, thus
permitting inclusion of the moderating variables, which do not vary across time but
whose inclusion is theoretically justifiable. Also, by including dummy variables for each
year in the models, the potential for within panel autocorrelation is mitigated.
3.4 RESULTS
Table 3 displays means for selected variables by the industries represented in the sample.
Some highlights include, firms in the defense industry, on average had the highest
incidence of cross-border acquisition activity and paper and packaging industry CEOs on

average had the highest accumulated value of retirement pay. The CEOs of oil and gas
firms had the highest value of in-the-money stock options.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Correlations and descriptive statistics for the entire sample are provided in table 4. To
assess if there are any multicollinearity issues, variance inflation factors (VEF) were
computed. All independent and control variables have VTF values well under the
suggested value of 10 (Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990) and the more stringent
recommendation of 4.0 (O'Brien, 2007). With the mean VIF being 1.35 and the
maximum being 1.75, multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. Also, to diminish
the potential for multicollinearity, as suggested by West and Aiken (1991), the individual
variables were mean-centered prior to calculating the interaction terms.
[Insert Table 4 about here]

Table 5 presents the negative binomial regression results. Model 1 contains the
control variables and moderating variables. Model 2 has the key explanatory variable
added in order to test the main effects hypotheses. The coefficient for CEO retirement
pay was positive and significant (0 =0.22, p < .05), indicating this variable has a positive
relationship with the firm's cross-border acquisition activity, thus supporting hypothesis
1. The coefficient for CEO in-the-money stock options also shows the expected positive
significant relation to cross-border acquisition activity (P =0.21, p < .05) providing
support for hypothesis 2.
Models 3 and 4 test the moderating effects of industry discretion and CEO duality
respectively. Model 3 tests the interactions between industry discretion with CEO
retirement pay and CEO in-the-money stock options. Hypothesis 3a fails to find support
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as the interaction term for the accumulated value of retirement pay and industry
discretion is not significant. The interaction term for CEO in-the-money stock options
and industry discretion is positive and significant (P =0.42, p < .001) supporting
hypothesis 3b, which states that industry discretion strengthens the positive relationship
between a CEO's in-the-money stock option holdings and the firm's cross-border
acquisition activity.
In model 4, the interaction term coefficient for the accumulated value of retirement
pay and CEO duality is not significant thus hypothesis 4a is not supported. The
coefficient for the interaction term of the accumulated value of in-the-money stock
options and CEO duality is positive and significant (P =0.26, p < .01), indicating support
for hypothesis 4b that CEO duality strengthens the relationship between in-the-money
stock options and cross-border acquisition activity.
The moderating hypotheses are also tested by entering the interaction effects jointly
in model 5. The results are similar to those in models 3 and 4. Hypotheses 3a and 4a
again fail to find support as the interactions between a CEO's accumulated value of
retirement pay with industry discretion and CEO duality are both insignificant. The
interaction term for the accumulated value of a CEO's in-the-money stock options with
industry discretion is significantly positive (p = 0.45, p < .001) as is the interaction with
CEO duality (P = 0.26, p < .01). Thus this model also indicates support for hypotheses 3b
and 4b. Evidence that the set of interaction terms account for significant residual variance
in the dependent variable is seen by a significant change in the Wald chi square statistics
between models 2 and 5 ( p < .05).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
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To illustrate the significant moderating influence of industry discretion and CEO
duality on the relationship between the accumulated value of in-the-money stock options
and cross-border acquisition activity, the regression slopes of the significant interactions
are graphed. Figure 5 depicts the change in cross border acquisitions based on changes in
CEO in-the-money stock options for low and high industry discretions. The slope is
steeper, when industry discretion is high; indicating the effect of the increasing value of
in-the-money stock options is reinforced with higher levels of industry discretion.
Figure 6, illustrates how the influence of CEO in-the-money stock options on crossborder acquisition activity differs with and without CEO duality. Again, the slope is
steeper when the CEO is also the chair of the firm's board than when he/she does not
hold both positions, suggesting this indicator of organizational discretion strengthens the
effects of in-the-money stock options on cross-border acquisition activity.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Two control variables were found to be significant at varying significance levels
throughout the models. Consistent with the literature, a firm's previous year's foreign
sales as a percent of total sales and the number of domestic acquisitions completed were
both shown to be positively related to cross-border acquisition activity.
The sensitivity of the hypothesized relationships to alternate operationalizations of
key variables, including separating out the accumulated value of the vested and unvested
in-the-money stock options as well as separating pension and deferred compensation
provided qualitatively similar results. Also, analysis done with zero-inflated Poisson was
conducted, but not found to be significantly superior to the one reported here.
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3.5 DISCUSSION
"The size of a nest egg is no measure of a mem" (Powell, 2010)
The research presented demonstrates the magnitude of'nest eggs' for a subset of U.S.
public firm CEOs in four industries; and while it may not illuminate the measure or
character of the holders of such levels of retirement pay or stock options, it does offer
understanding and explanation of how these compensation elements may impact strategic
decisions. Specifically, the findings indicate that the accumulated value of both CEO
retirement pay and in-the-money stock options are positively related to cross-border
acquisition activity.
The analyses also highlight the moderating effects of managerial discretion, arising
from the firm's external industry context and internal organizational leadership structure.
Both types of discretion significantly strengthened the relationship between the
accumulated value of CEO in-the-money stock options and cross-border acquisition
activity.
Interestingly, neither of the discretion measures significantly interacted with the
accumulated value of retirement pay. One possible explanation for these non-findings
may be that since this compensation element is largely insulated from losses, even with
endowment effects occurring, the motivating effects are sufficiently strong enough that
having or not having latitude of action (discretion) has minimal impact. Secondly, as
discussed previously, with stock options CEOs are likely to be much more cognizant of
how acquisitions link to market reaction and thus stock price, and having greater
discretion would likely be perceived as having a greater opportunity to impact stock
prices.
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Additionally, since the stock options are in-the-money, implying stock price has risen
since the options were awarded, CEOs may experience feelings of hubris, or overconfidence in their abilities to positively impact future stock prices. Research by Li and
Tang (2010) indicated the effects of hubris on a firm's decision to invest in a new, hightechnology project were intensified by increases in industry discretion and CEO duality.
The theorizing and empirical findings presented in this study have a number of
implications for management research. First, by focusing on an understudied, yet
substantial element of executive compensation packages and demonstrating that strategic
decisions may indeed be sensitive to the magnitude of a CEO's pension and deferred
compensation, an important gap in the literature is addressed. As such, this work suggests
ample opportunities to further elucidate the consequences of these pay elements on a
variety of firm and individual level outcomes, including the ultimate performance
outcomes. Examining the determinants of these elements of compensation would be a
valuable addition to the literature as well.
The findings that in-the-money stock options exert a positive influence on crossborder acquisition activity broaden previous research that has primarily looked at the
antecedent effects of awarding of stock option (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; 2008). It also
helps to reconcile previous inconsistencies in the literature with respect to these types of
options and in particular, extends the line of inquiry recently advanced by Devers et al.
(2008) that stresses the importance of considering the nuances of individual pay elements
in eliciting actions executives take on behalf of their organizations.
The results highlighting the moderating effects of managerial discretion, arising from
factors in a firm's industry and organizational power structures, also contribute to
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research on acquisitions and CEO compensation as well as that focused on understanding
the role of managerial discretion in strategic decision making. Previous research on
managerial discretion has primarily focused on that arising from the external industry
context (Boyd & Gove, 2006) and examined its moderating effects on relationships
between demographic characteristics such as top management team (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1990) or CEO tenure (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007), and CEO dominance
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993), with firm decisions. The previous research has not
considered how managerial discretion may moderate the motivating influence of CEO
incentive compensation elements. The findings of this research suggest managerial
discretion may play an important role in strengthening the influence of stock option
compensation.
Early strategy literature defined risk as income stream variance and found it to be
negatively related to performance (e.g., Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991). More recently,
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) theorize and demonstrate that increasing awards of CEO
stock options leads to more extreme performance, as CEO attention is focused
predominantly to the upside potential of risk taking (increasing their own personal wealth
via stock price increases) while practically ignoring the possible downsides promoting
risk taking that leads to the high variability of performance. This is in the same vein as
our theorizing on the risk bearing effects of stock options and retirement pay and while
our study does not examine the performance outcomes or quality of cross-border
acquisition activity induced by the various compensation elements, future studies may
want to consider this aspect.
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Implications for practice also emanate from this research. As the business world
becomes increasingly competitive and complex, firms face increasing pressure to grow
profits by expanding their businesses across national boundaries. Hence, understanding
the role that retirement pay alongside other incentives may play in motivating managers
to effectively form and implement strategies that lead firms to compete effectively, is of
great importance to practicing managers and other firm stakeholders. Being aware that
retirement pay is a substantial portion of compensation arrangements and understanding
its consequences serves as a caution to executives as well as to boards of directors who
are charged with the responsibility of creating such compensation contracts.
CEO compensation has received substantial attention and provoked numerous calls
for reform from both the business press and academic scholars with regards to its
excessiveness as well as it not being adequately linked to value-added firm outcomes
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2005; Boyd, Franco Santos, & Shen, 2012; Tosi et al., 2000). This is
underscored by the fact that 89% of the CEOs in the sample, who on average had 7 years
of tenure with their firms, had some type of defined benefit pension on average worth
$6.4 million dollars, while only 20% of the total private sector employees in the U.S. had
accessibility to such programs in 2007 (Cushing-Daniels & Johnson, 2008). Since the
SEC now requires disclosure of the value of defined benefit pension compensation paid
to firm executives, this issue is likely to garner increased attention and ire from the
public. Therefore, it is likely to be an issue that boards and regulators will be increasingly
pressured to address.
Despite these promising results several limitations of this study warrant attention.
Although I theorize that retirement pay and stock options motivate CEOs' to engage in
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acquisitions, the study lacks direct measures of CEOs' motivations. The research
presented here would be greatly enhanced by additional fine-grained data at the
individual decision maker level.
In addition, while CEOs are expected to be highly involved in acquisition decisions, I
acknowledge that other key decision makers in the firm may also play influential roles in
acquisition and other strategic decisions. Opportunities therefore exist to also explore the
impact of compensation, in particular retirement pay on other strategic decisions and on
how they affect risk perceptions and propensities of other firm decision makers.
Finally the sample focuses only on U.S. public companies operating primarily in four
industries and therefore the study may not accurately characterize relationships between
the studied elements of compensation and acquisition activity in private firms, other
industries or other national environments. Nevertheless, it is hoped the context I have
examined provides impetus for further research that will address questions of
generalizability.
Conclusions
A theoretical model drawing from the BAM has been presented and tested that
demonstrates how retirement pay and in-the-money stock options influence CEOs' to
undertake cross-border acquisitions. It is hoped the work presented here will motivate
further research, as it is believed that individual elements of compensation may serve as
powerful antecedents for a plethora of strategic decisions and outcomes. Therefore, there
remains many unanswered research questions about the role compensation elements play
with regards to strategic outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4
FIRM LEVEL R&D INVESTMENT, ATTAINMENT DISCREPANCIES AND
NATIONAL SOCIAL CULTURE: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS IN
THE PAPER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
"...whether research be originally undertaken merely because the firm is convinced that
profitable new opportunities will come out of it, or because it is considered necessary for
survival in a competitive world, it enables...firms to turn aside the process of 'creative
destruction' and to thrive on the novelty which might otherwise have destroyed them.
(Penrose, 1959: 115).
Edith Penrose's (1959) insights from over 50 years ago, of the importance of research
and development (R&D) investment to firm success and survival seem particularly
relevant in today's globalized knowledge-based economy. The R&D process involves
creating, disseminating and applying knowledge to generate innovations in firm
technologies, products, and management systems (Greve, 2003; Hovakimian, Opler, &
Titman, 2001; O'Brien, 2003; Vincente-Lorente, 2001; Wang, 2010).
Investing in R&D differs from other corporate investments in that the outcomes
associated with R&D have long-term future oriented profit horizons, require input and
coordinated effort from multiple hierarchical levels in the firm, and have payoffs that are
often ambiguous and highly uncertain. (Bernardo, Cai & Luo, 2001; Lee & O'Neill,
2003; Shi, 2003). R&D investment is often used as a proxy for risk taking and as risk
preferences may differ, the level of investment in R&D is expected to vary across firms.
(Hill & Snell, 1989; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Rajgopal &
Shevlin, 2002; Singh, 1986).
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For example, researchers drawing from the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert &
March, 1963) suggest that firms as goal-oriented and information-processing entities,
compare their performance relative to an aspiration level, not just on an absolute value.
These comparisons serve to motivate the firm to engage in search processes that either
solve short-term problems or provide innovative new technologies and/or products (Cyert
& March, 1963). The behavioral theory of the firm contends firm behavior manifested as
strategic choices, is goal-directed and history-dependent (Levitt & March, 1988). Since
much of the behavioral theory of the firm research has been conducted in single country
settings, little consideration has been given to how the values, beliefs and assumptions
that constitute the culture within firms' home country boundaries may encourage and
enable pursuing some types of goals while discouraging and hindering others. This study
seeks to address that particular gap.
Indeed, sociologists (e.g., Beck, 1992; Dake, 1991; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Rayner, 1992) have long concluded that the "risk perception is determined by the norms,
value systems and cultural idiosyncrasies of societies" (Rohrmann & Renn, 2000:18).
Since R&D investments have uncertain future outcomes and often have a low probability
of success (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999) they are frequently employed to represent firm
risk taking (Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter, 2010; Bhagat & Welch; 1995; Coles, Daniel, &
Naveen, 2006). This further underscores the importance of considering the influence of
the national culture firms have been founded in and remain currently embedded in.
In this study, we theorize that firm level R&D investments are not only influenced by
a firm's performance relative to aspirations, but are significantly constrained or enabled
by what constitutes legitimate actions with respect to cultural dimensions in a firm's
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home country. Specifically, we assess how the social norms operating in a firm's home
country influences the perception of the saliency of the following: investing in the future
(future orientation), collective coordination and decision making (institutional
collectivism), maintenance of hierarchy (power distance), and dealing with ambiguous
and uncertain situations (uncertainty avoidance). The theoretical framework is tested with
a sample of firms from 11 countries, operating between 2002 and 2010 in the global
paper products industry. In the past decade due to the rise of digital media and increasing
pressures for environmental sustainability, firms competing in this industry have arguably
been engaged in combating what could be aptly described as Schumpeter's (1942: 83)
"gale of creative destruction."
The study seeks to make a contribution to the literature in several specific ways. First,
while there has been a considerable work investigating determinants of R&D investment
with single-country samples, this analysis using data from firms operating in a single
industry in multiple countries allows an exploration of the relative importance of various
firm- and national-level variables. In doing so, we answer calls (e.g., Gavetti, Levinthal,
& Ocasio, 2007) for examining how search processes may be influenced by the
environmental context in which an organization is embedded in.
Second, by focusing on national culture, an informal institution this study
complements recent work by Hillier, Pindado, Queiroz, and Torre (2011) who examined
the role of formal institutions such as investor protections on R&D investment in firms
from 11 countries. Our examination of cultural dimensions that constitute informal
institutional forces, also addresses concerns put forth by scholars (e.g., Hart, 2001;
Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 2002) that studies of firm level strategic decisions has
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mostly examined the role of formal institutions. Therefore, this research contributes to
furthering understanding of how different elements of the institutional environments that
firms are embedded in through their founding, explain variation in investment decisions
across firms
This research also presents new evidence on how a firm's home country cultural
dimensions can motivate and inhibit investment in firm-level R&D, thus addressing
concerns raised by international business scholars (e.g., Venaik & Brewer, 2010) of the
scarcity of studies looking at national cultural dimensions and firm-level decisions.
Additionally, by using a multi-country sample, and accounting for the culture in which
firms are embedded in, empirical support is generated for the behavioral theory of the
firm prediction that when firm performance is above aspirations (positive attainment
discrepancy) firms are motivated to seek out experimental and innovative activities
through investment in R&D activities. Thus, we offer evidence of additional determinants
of R&D investment, which may help explain the inconsistent findings concerning this
behavioral theory of the firm prediction in single country studies (e.g., Greve, 2003;
Miller & Chen, 2007; Wu & Tu, 2007). Also, by demonstrating the saliency of behavioral
theory of the firm in a variety cultures, the boundary conditions for the theory are
extended suggesting it may be an appropriate organizing theoretical framework for
exploring other international business phenomena.
Finally, by using both GLOBE and Hofstede cultural measures in the analysis, the
study hopes to not only provide a more complete understanding about the effects of
culture, but also to add to the debate and the efforts to further understand how and why
these sets of measures converge and diverge with respect to firm level decisions.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review
theory on determinants of firm level R& D investment, specifically developing
theoretical arguments for how firm performance relative to aspirations may promote
search processes resulting in greater R&D investment. This is followed by considering
the role that the theoretically relevant national culture dimensions in a firm's home
country may play in encouraging or hindering R&D investment decisions by firms.
Following the development of the firm and national level hypotheses, the data and
estimation method are described and the empirical results reported. Finally, the paper
concludes with a discussion of the main findings and the implications for theory and
practice.
4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In today's globalized knowledge-based economy, firm success and survival often
depends on creativity, discovery, innovation, and inventiveness. R&D investment is often
linked to these constructs and while concurring with other researchers (e.g., Laursen, &
Salter, 2006; Kelm, Narayanan, & Pinches, 1995; Tushman & Nelson, 1990) that R&D is
not the sole determinant of creating knowledge based resources, new products and
markets, it is a visible manifestation that these strategies are important to firm managers
who are responsible for making investment decisions.
The extant literature puts forth various arguments about what motivates or
discourages firms to invest in R&D. Explanations for the variation across firms have
included determinants at the firm, industry, and home country level. (Chen, 2008a,b;
Cumming & Macintosh, 2000; Hillier et al., 2011; Lee & Sung, 2005; Scherer, 1982;). In
this study, the aim is twofold, one, to examine how R&D investments of different firms
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in a single industry are rooted in their experience with performing better than aspirations,
as future choices are often influenced by past success (Laursen, & Salter, 2006) and
secondly, to assess the degree to which R&D investment is encouraged or discouraged
by the national culture in which the firms are embedded.
Performance Attainment Discrepancy and Firm R&D Investment
R&D investment decisions have a rich tradition in the extant literature of being
associated with search processes. Cyert and March's (1963) behavioral theory of the firm
offers a conceptual framework of organizational search determinants. The theory
contends organizations, as goal-directed systems, set aspirations that are used to simplify
decision-making processes. In other words, rather than using absolute measures of
performance, firms consider performance relative to aspiration levels within a specific
context.
The difference between the actual performance and the aspired level of performance
is referred to as the "attainment discrepancy" (Lant, 1992). When actual performance
exceeds the aspired performance, the firm has a positive attainment discrepancy, whereas
a negative attainment discrepancy occurs when actual performance is below the aspired
level. The attainment discrepancy categorizes performance as successful or failing thus
simplifying interpretation by decision makers. The specific interpretations of
performance relative to aspirations lead to search behavior, according to the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963).
When performance is below the aspiration level (negative attainment discrepancy)
search entails identifying "alternatives to current activities that resolve performance
shortfalls" (Iyer & Miller, 2008: 808). Empirical analyses have generally found that firms
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take greater risks, considered to be a means of searching, in order to reduce or eliminate
the existing attainment discrepancy immediately (Bromiley, 1991; Bromiley, Miller, &
Rau, 2001; Miller & Chen, 2004; Nickel & Rodriguez, 2002). However, when
performance is so poor that there is a threat of bankruptcy or survival, less risk taking has
been observed (Iyer & Miller, 2008; March & Shapira, 1987).
Empirical evidence of search, or risk taking in the situation where performance
exceeds aspirations (positive attainment discrepancy) has been rather ambiguous (Miller
& Chen, 2004; Iyer & Miller, 2008). As "success tends to breed slack" (Cyert & March,
1963: 278), researchers have sought to associate a variety of measures of slack with this
type of search. Results with respect to innovation have also been mixed with some
researchers showing various types of slack have positive relationships (e.g., Damanpour,
1991), others demonstrating non-linear (inverted U) associations (Nohria & Gulati, 1997)
or even no relationships (e.g., Greve, 2003). Organizational slack has been viewed
positively as a resource that facilitates innovation, by providing a cushion in case
experimental and innovative projects fail (Bourgeois, 1981); and viewed negatively, as it
indicates the firm has not used its resources to its full potential (Williamson, 1963).
Firms in today's globalized competitive arena are under increasing pressures from
capital markets and shareholders to effectively operate as 'lean' as possible. Therefore,
rather than assume organizational slack is negatively or positively viewed by managers
and motivates search, we suggest that it is more prudent to assume that managers clearly
view their firm's successful performance positively. While having a positive attainment
discrepancy is likely to result in accumulating slack, it is also likely to facilitate search,
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whereby firm managers will be more inclined to make investments so that they may seek
out experimental and innovative activities.
Slack has been argued to increase with persistent performance above aspiration level
(Levinthal & March, 1981), but with the heightened competitiveness brought on by
globalization and technological change, it is unlikely firms will let slack accumulate over
time due to pressure for efficiencies and lowering of costs. Therefore, having short-term
(e.g., the previous year) successful performance versus competitors is likely to motivate
similar behavior that has been attributed to possessing slack resources: relaxing of
controls and a greater willingness for experimentation (Cyert & March, 1963).
When firms have performed better than competitors, the fear of failure is likely to be
diminished, and decision-makers, are more likely to be willing to invest in and engage in
risky initiatives according to behavioral theory of the firm. Indeed, Laursen and Salter
(2006) and Chen (2008a) argue that search is motivated not only by past performance but
also by expectations about the future. In sum, if firms have been successful in the past,
they are also likely to be confident about future performance, and again may exhibit an
increased willingness to invest in risky ventures often associated with R&D activities.
Based on the presented arguments, the following hypothesis is put forth:
Hypothesis 1: Previous positive attainment discrepancy by the firm will be
positively related to subsequent firm-level R&D investment.
Home Country National Social Culture and Firm R&D Investment
By relying on the behavioral theory of the firm perspective, we have argued firms'
willingness to invest in R&D represents search strategies that are rooted in experience
with past performance feedback. This builds upon the behavioral theory of the firm
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assumption that firm behavior manifested as strategic choices is goal directed and history
dependent (Levitt & March, 1988). However, previous behavioral theory of the firm
research has been conducted primarily in single-country settings, giving little
consideration to how the values, beliefs and assumptions that constitute the culture within
national boundaries may encourage and enable pursuing some types of goals while
discouraging and hindering others (Schwartz, 1999). In other words, how a firm
experiences performance feedback, specifically its attainment discrepancy and perceives
the riskiness of R&D investment is likely to be affected by the national culture of the
firm's home country.
National culture has been defined in numerous ways, and in this study we use
GLOBE's definition of culture: "the shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and
interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experience of
members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations" (House et al., 1999:
182). With this definition, culture is seen as affecting the perceptions and interpretations
of past experience and future expectations. Making it particularly relevant for
understanding how firm decision makers respond to attainment discrepancies and how
they view undertaking investments in risky ventures such as R&D.
The GLOBE culture scheme has nine dimensions, and following the example of
others (e.g., Parboteeah, Hoegl, & Cullen, 2008) we include only those dimensions which
have a theoretical rationale for being associated with the phenomena of interest, firm
level R&D investments. R&D investments, unlike many other strategic investment
decisions, are expected to have longer term pay-offs, with rewards expected to occur in
the future (Bernardo et al., 2001, Miller & Chen, 2007). Therefore we expect the future
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orientation (FO) dimension, which accounts for how a society views and values futureoriented behaviors (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004. 282), to be
associated with R&D investment decisions. Since R&D activities require input and
coordinated effort from organizational members (Lee & O'Neill, 2003; Shi, 2003), we
include institutional collectivism (IC), which is concerned with the importance of
consensus-based behavior and focusing on interdependencies (House et al., 2004). This
collaborative effort typically includes multiple hierarchical levels in the firm, suggesting
power distance (PD), or the way power distribution is perceived to provide social order,
may also be pertinent to R&D investment, thus it is also included. Finally, since R&D
investments have payoffs that are often ambiguous and highly uncertain. (Bernardo, Cai
& Luo, 2001; Lee & O'Neill, 2003; Shi, 2003), the level of uncertainty avoidance (UA)
is considered as the society's sensitivity to risk and uncertainty is likely to be relevant
with respect to R&D investment. In the sections which follow we draw from national
social culture literature and hypothesize how firm level R&D investments are constrained
or enabled by what constitutes legitimate actions with respect to the four home country
cultural dimensions of FO, IC, PD, and UA.
Future orientation (FO). GLOBE defines FO as "the degree to which individuals in
organizations or societies engage in future-orientated behaviours such as planning,
investing in the future, and delaying individual or collective gratification" (House et al.,
2004: 12). The theoretical foundation of GLOBE's FO is similar to Hofstede's (2001:
359) long-term orientation (LTO), which is defined as "the fostering of virtues oriented
towards future rewards."
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Societies with high levels of FO focus on delayed gratification and achieving success
at a later time. This dimension captures the extent to which members of a society believe
that their current actions will influence their future, and therefore focuses on planning and
investment in their future (House et al., 2004). GLOBE researchers found that future
oriented cultures are positively associated with the capacity to invest and succeed in basic
science and technology (House et al., 2004). In addition, they observed that
organizational members with high FO tend to deal more effectively with future
uncertainties and challenges (House et al., 2004). Since the benefits of R&D and
innovation are considered to be distant and uncertain (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999), firms
from countries that value investing in the future will likely be more intrinsically positive
towards such futuristic investments as R&D.
Empirical support is offered by Waarts and Van Everdingen (2005) in a study of
firms from 10 European countries. They find Hofstede's LTO measure has significant
positive influence on firm level decisions to adopt (invest in) new systems or innovations
(enterprise resource planning software). Since cultures with high FO tend to place a
higher priority on long-term success over short-term satisfactions, members of these
societies will more likely look further into the future for assessing the effects of their
current actions (House, et al., 2004), rather than being limited in their present situations.
This is an important characteristic for R&D investments. Therefore the following
relationship is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: High levels of future orientation in afirm's home country national
culture will be positively related to firm level R&D investment.
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Institutional collectivism (IC). Collectivism has to do with the extent to which the
group as opposed to the self, is the prime social identifier (Hofstede, 1997). The GLOBE
research distinguishes between two types of collectivism dimensions: institutional and ingroup collectivism, the former focusing on the societal and organizational levels (House
et al., 2004) and the latter at the family and individual level (Brewer & Venaik, 2010).
Because the aim of this study is to identify the relationship between country level culture
variables and firms' R&D investments, IC is the more appropriate construct for the
analysis. According to GLOBE, IC refers to "the degree to which organizational and
societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources
and collective action" (House et al., 2004: 12).
In cultures with high IC, individuals are more likely to build relationships and
commitments within groups, with group goals often taking precedence over individual
goals (House et al., 2004). Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) found that high degrees of
collectivism promoted new product development by emphasizing interdependence,
cooperation, and unified purpose. They argued that Japanese teams, characterized by high
collectivism, demonstrated high consensus, were more likely to create a sense of
belonging and to feel an obligation to contribute all of which positively affect innovation
(Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996). Similarly, Lee and O'Neill (2003) found that R&D
investment was higher in collectivist Japan than in the more individualistic U.S. They
attributed this to collectivist Japanese culture being more conducive to the development
of long-term relationships with higher levels of trust that drives R&D investments.
Research using a sample of U.S. IPO firms in the medical and surgical instruments
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industry indicated that top management teams with collective confidence displayed a
greater proclivity for investing in R&D projects (Kor, 2006).
Taylor and Wilson (2012) add to the abovementioned research by finding that IC
fosters innovation at the national level. Innovations often require enduring high-levels of
uncertainty, as do societies confronting the costs and distributive effects of scientific
research and technological change (Acemoglu, 2009). Societies which emphasize IC may
be more likely to facilitate a social environment in which both innovators and those
bearing the costs of change are more willing to endure these difficulties for the benefit of
their society (Taylor & Wilson, 2012).
In countries built on collectivist values, coordination, commitment, and harmony are
likely to be important values of organizational members. These attributes may produce
circumstances where experimentation and risk taking initiatives have a greater level of
acceptability as they perceive it will provide mutual benefits for all involved, as well as
feeling they have mutual safeguards if the investment doesn't turn out as intended. In
addition, decision makers operating in firms from countries high in IC are likely to feel
greater confidence in the likelihood that the group (i.e., firm decision makers) will be
able to achieve the intended goals associated with R&D investments, as these type of
activities often require coordination throughout organizations (Lee & O'Neill, 2003; Shi,
2003) Therefore, we predict:
Hypothesis 3: High levels of institutional collectivism in a firm's home country
national culture will be positively related to firm level R&D investment.
Power distance (PD). PD refers to the degree to which members of a society expect
and agree that power should be distributed hierarchically (Hofstede, 2001; House et al.,
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2004). In high PD countries people accept inequalities as a legitimate basis of
relationships and proper societal functioning (Hofstede, 2001). In contrast, individuals in
low PD societies believe that inequalities should be minimized (Hofstede, 2001).
Firms from low PD cultures tend to value a flexible organizational structure and the
approach to management is thought to be associated with higher capacities for knowledge
acquisition and creativity among employees (Dodgson, 1993; Lyles & Salk, 1996). Also,
equally, well-motivated employees are more likely to participate in teams so as to better
capture new market opportunities and develop new products for the company (Lyles &
Salk, 1996). For instance, Damanpour (1991) found that participatory work environments
facilitate innovation by increasing organizational members' awareness, commitment, and
involvement. Similarly, work by Thompson (1965) indicated that the concentration of
decision-making authority hindered innovative solutions, while the dispersion of power
enabled innovation.
Researchers have linked higher innovation effectiveness to having authority and
control at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy, less centralization of knowledge,
increasing adjustment and redefinition of tasks through employee interactions, and lateral
communication (Abbey & Dickson, 1983; Keller & Holland, 1983; Pelz & Andrews,
1976). All of these attributes are more indicative of low PD cultures. In sum, in the
extant literature, low PD has been shown to be a predictor of innovation activities
(Mokyr, 1991; Rothwell & Wissema, 1986;), innovation success (Jones & Davies, 2000),
product and process inventions (Shane, 1992), and R&D productivity (Kedia, Keller, &
Julian, 1992).
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Countries high in PD tend to have societal members that have a strong propensity to
resist change in new environments and situations (Harzing & Hofstede, 1996; Kirkman &
Shapiro, 1997). High PD countries are more likely to have underlying rules that serve as
road blocks for changes and innovations. As previous research indicates, since high PD
cultures often have a great inclination to uphold rigid hierarchies, it may be more difficult
to initiate and sustain creativity, as workforces in these cultures have strong dependence
needs and expect superiors to behave autocratically and not to consult them (House, et
al., 2004). Firms operating in this context are less likely to be supportive of investing in
R&D initiatives.
As observed by GLOBE researchers, a low PD culture is characterized by a balanced
power structure, where each individual is respected and appreciated for what that person
has to offer (House et al, 2004). Lacking this balanced power structure would likely
hinder contributions of creative knowledge and resources, which will have an imprinting
effect on willingness to invest in R&D initiatives. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: High levels ofpower distance in a firm's home country national
culture will be negatively related to firm level R&D investment.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA). As defined by the GLOBE study, UA refers to "the
extent to which members of collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure,
formalized procedures, and laws to cover situations in their daily lives" (Sully de Luque
& Javidan, 2004: 603). Individuals in cultures with lower UA are more tolerant of
differences in behaviors and opinions, and are less threatened by new situations
(Hofstede, 1983). In societies with high UA, there is a preference for consistency and
structure over uncertainty and ambiguity (House et al., 2004). Because the outcomes and
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benefits of R&D investment are uncertain, it is logical to expect this type of investment
will be lower in high UA cultures.
In high UA societies there is a greater tendency to favor administrative structures and
systems with more rules and controls (Horovitz, 1980). People in high UA countries feel
the need to avoid, or manage ambiguous situations with these rules and controls, rejecting
novel ideas (Kedia & Bhagat, 1988; Schneider, 1989). As a result, high UA cultures tend
to have bureaucratic organizations with more structured activities and more task oriented
management teams, which may lead to less creative freedom and ultimately less concern
with being innovative (Aiken & Hage, 1971).
To the contrary, countries with low UA are characterized by flexibility and
acceptance of nonconformity suggesting they may be more conducive to novel ideas, new
behaviors, creativity and innovation (Shane, 1995). Previous research has indeed found
associations between low UA national culture and national rates of innovativeness
(Shane, 1995; Mueller & Thomas, 2000), innovation process activities (Shane, 1995),
corporate venturing process (Venkataraman, Shane, McGrath & Macmillan 1993), and
entrepreneurship (McGrath, MacMillan, Yang, & Tsai 1992).
Shane (1995) argues that people in uncertainty-accepting societies are more willing to
take risks and are less in need of security and stability, as they are confident in their own
beliefs, rather than what societal norms dictate. Jones and Davies (2000) theorize that
lower UA is associated with individuals being more accepting of competition and
colleague dissent. In these situations formalized rules are 'frowned upon', and there is
greater likelihood for innovative capabilities to develop. It is generally thought in the
literature (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2008; Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996) that high UA
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impedes a firm's innovative capabilities. As discussed previously, R&D investment has
been shown to have a strong association with firm innovation. (Hovakimian, et al., 2000;
O'Brien, 2003; Vincente-Lorente, 2001).
While behavioral theory of the firm does not directly address how national cultural
dimensions may impact the goal directed behavior of firms, Cyert and March (1963 . 297)
in developing their framework, "accept as a given the uncertainty avoidance motivations
of the firm." Therefore, if a firm is embedded in a national context that views the cultural
dimension of UA as constituting legitimate behavior, it is likely these firms will tend to
avoid making large investments in activities such R&D that are characterized as having
uncertain outcomes. Thus based on these arguments, when UA is high in a firm's home
country, firm managers are expected to exhibit greater risk aversion and be more
skeptical about investing in R&D leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: High levels of uncertainty avoidance in a firm's home country
national culture will be negatively related to firm level R&D investment.
4.3 METHODS
Sample
The hypotheses are tested in a longitudinal study of firms operating in the global
paper products industry (SIC codes 2621 and 2631) between 2002 and 2010 that are
listed in the Thomson One Worldscope database. The global paper products industry
generated $350.7 billion in revenues during 2010. Asia-Pacific accounts for 40.8% of the
global market value. Europe accounts for 28.1%, North and South America make up
28%, with the rest of the world comprising the remaining 3.1%. (DataMonitor, 2011).
The industry structure is very similar across the globe with respect to raw materials,
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technology, suppliers, market channels, and selling practices (DataMonitor, 2011),
suggesting it is an appropriate sample for teasing out the impact of the variances in
national culture and performance attainment discrepancy. Furthermore, due to the rise in
digital media and worldwide pressure for sustainable environmental practices (Fischer,
2012; Line, 2012), it is arguably an industry that is currently dealing with the 'gale of
creative destruction.' As such, this reality underscores the importance of R&D
investment to firms in this industry, as they will need to innovate better and faster than
competitors both within and outside the industry boundaries.
The final sample consists of 67 firms from the following 11 countries: Canada, China,
Finland, India, Japan, Korea, South Africa, Sweden, Taiwan, United Kingdom and
United States. These countries provide a range of differing national cultural environments
representing both emerging and developed economies. Not all firms are in existence or
report data from 2002 -2010, so the final sample consists of 417 firm years.
Variables
R&D investment. The dependent variable R&D investment is measured as the
proportion of research and development expenditures to sales, following previous
researchers (e.g., Greve, 2003; Lee & O'Neill, 2003). The natural log transformation is
used to meet normality assumptions.
Performance attainment discrepancy. The measurement of performance
attainment discrepancy is based on the social aspiration level, or average industry wide
performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998). Other empirical studies have used
linear combinations of firm historical performance and social aspirations, utilizing
different weights performance (e.g., Greve, 2003; Wiseman & Bromiley 1996), however,

this assumes managers are applying the same weights (Nickel and Rodriguez, 2002).
Given this level of ambiguity, we follow other researchers (e.g., Arora & Dharwadkar,
2011; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 1998; Miller & Chen, 2004) and avoid this technique.
We focus on the social aspiration as this is likely to be the more salient reference for
managers in the sample, as they seek to make R&D investments that are better and faster
than competitors. Also, research has demonstrated managers often explain poor historical
performance as being dependent on environmental factors (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991),
believing they have little control over these factors (Lant & Shapira, 2008). However if
performance compared to competitors is poor, it will be more difficult to blame external
factors, as rivals will be exposed to similar effects and disruptions.
The performance attainment discrepancy is calculated following the procedure used
by previous researchers (e.g., Arora & Dhardwadkar, 2011; Bromiley, 1991) whereby the
attainment discrepancy is the difference between the focal firm's actual performance and
the social aspiration level performance. To determine the social aspiration level, again
following the precedence in the literature (Arora & Dhardwadkar, 2011; Bromiley, 1991),
we compute the average of the performance of other firms in the industry in the prior year
and use this as the social aspiration for those firms performing below the industry
average. For firms with performance above the industry average, the industry average is
multiplied by 1.05, to represent a 5% increase. When actual performance is above the
social aspiration level, the attainment discrepancy is positive (or higher) and when it is
below it will be negative (or lower).
There are various measures for firm performance and in this study Tobin's Q is
employed. Tobin's Q is measured as market capitalization plus total debt divided by total
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assets (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Tobin's Q has been used by researchers as a
measure that specifically reflects managerial performance for generating income from an
asset base (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), making it a relevant measure for this study
as the concern is how firm managers strategically respond to performance attainment
discrepancies.
National social culture. The GLOBE (House et al., 2004) measures of FO, PD, UA,
and IC, are used to represent the national culture constructs that are theoretically pertinent
to the study. Because the study is concerned with modeling the influence of culture on
managerial practice with respect to R&D investment decisions, we use the "as is"
measures. The GLOBE variables have been heralded for their robust and rigorous
attention to reliability and validity (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & de Luque,
2006; Sarala & Vaara, 2010). However, similar to others (e.g., Brock, Shenkar, Shoham,
& Siscovick, 2008; Parboteeah et al., 2008) we also run models with the corresponding
Hofstede (2001) measures and discuss where the results converge and diverge.
Control variables. Several control variables at the firm level are included in the
models to rule out alternative explanations. Organizational slack, a notable construct in
the behavioral theory of the firm frameworks, has been shown to be associated with risktaking initiatives (Greve, 2003; Iyer & Miller, 2008) including R&D investments (e.g.,
Chen, 2008; Miller & Chen, 2007; Wu & Tu, 2007). Organizational slack, is argued to
provide a "cushion of actual or potential resources" that encourages exploration type
activities such as R&D expenditures (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).
Slack has been categorized as absorbed, unabsorbed and potential (Bourgeois, 1981).
Several researchers (e.g., Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Iyer & Miller, 2008) suggest
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available and potential slack, which represent uncommitted available resources, provide
greater discretion to managers and are more relevant to influencing investment decisions,
than absorbed slack, which is not recoverable or available to managers. Therefore, we
control for these two types of slack. Debt-to-assets is used as a measure of potential slack
(Brush, Bromiley, & Hendricks, 2000; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Waddock &
Graves, 1997). High debt levels have been shown to be negatively related to R&D
expenditures (Hillier et al, 2011) as generally, firms with higher debt levels will have
higher interest payment obligations, which may impact the level of investment they are
willing to tie up in R&D projects. The free cash flow, measured as the operating cash
flow minus cash dividends and capital expenditures, scaled by total assets is used as a
proxy for unabsorbedslack (Davis & Stout, 1992; Hillier et al., 2011). Ascioglu, Hegde,
& McDermott, 2008) demonstrate that when firms have high cash flows they are more
positive about R&D activity.
Relationships between R&D investment and firm size have been equivocal (Lee &
Sung, 2005), with some showing positive effects of size (e.g., Cohen & Klepper, 1996)
and others showing no significant relationships (e.g., Klette & Griliches, 2000).
Nonetheless, firm size has been repeatedly shown to influence organizations outcomes
(Audia & Greve, 2006). Hence, Firm size is measured as the natural log of sales
(Baysinger & Kosnick, 1991).
We also include firm age, as it may affect firm risk taking behavior (Carpenter, et al.,
2003) and younger firms have been shown to have more growth opportunities, thus this
could encourage R&D investment (Filatotchev & Piesse, 2009; Kim & Lu , 2011). Firm
age is measured as the number of years since the firm was founded.

Several national level variables are also included. In a recent study of R&D
investment in firms operating in nine European Union countries, the U.S. and Japan,
Hillier et al., (2010) find that two formal institutional variables, level of investor
protection and financial system development in a firm's home country reduce the
sensitivity of R&D to internal cash flow. Countries with poor shareholder protection have
also been shown to have markets that respond negatively to R&D investment (Hall &
Oriani, 2006) which could discourage investing in these types of activities. Firms may
need external financing in order to finance R&D projects and research has shown that
external financing is more prevalent in countries with highly developed financial systems
(Beck & Levine, 2002). Therefore we control for the level of shareholder protection and
financial system support. The variables are measured using annual country level scores
collected and reported by World Competitiveness Report (WCR)3 published by IMD Geneva, for the period under analysis. Shareholder protection is measured using the
WCR indicator that represents the statement "Shareholders' rights are sufficiently
implemented". The index is coded from 0 to 10, so that higher scores correspond to
higher level of investor protection. Financial system support is also on a 1 -10 scale
and reflect agreement with the statement, "Banking and financial services do support
business activities efficiently"

s IMD

conducts an annual survey of senior and middle managers from a cross-section of
firms operating in each country during the year. The sample size for each country is
proportional to the GDP of each economy and the sample of respondents is representative
of the entire economy. Respondents are asked a series of questions about the institutional
environment evaluating it using a Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 to 6. Average values
are obtained for each country on an annual basis and converted into a 0 to 10 scale.
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National wealth, which has been shown to influence how a society views businesses
and R&D investment (Braconier, 2000; Lichtenberg, 1993; Schneper & Guillen, 2004), is
also included as a control variable. The variable is measured as the real gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita normalized to purchasing power parity (Lawler, Chen, Wu,
Bae, & Bai, 2011). The annual data comes from World Competitiveness Report published
by IMD - Geneva. All independent and control variables are lagged one year in the
analyses
Modeling and Analysis
The data for this study is comprised of observations of firms nested in countries over
time representing a multilevel data structure. As the study involves assessing the impact
of country-level cultural factors on firm level R&D investment over time, the error terms
associated with firms in the same country are most likely not independent of each other
(hence there is autocorrelation) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). In addition, a model
with both firm and country level variables implies a composite error term because it can
be broken down into several error terms, some of which are dependent on the lower level
variables (leading to heteroskedasticity) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). As the
number of firms varies across countries, there is also the possibility that a country level
variable coefficient may indicate significance due to a disproportionately larger sample
size at the firm level (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). Therefore to address these issues
and diminish the risk of overestimating the precision with which the effects of different
variables influence the outcome variable, and wrongly concluding that certain variables
have a significant influence when in fact this is not true, we use a mixed modeling
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techniques (also known as the hierarchical linear modeling or multilevel random
coefficient modeling) to test the hypotheses (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).
Following the example of other multilevel national culture research (e.g., Parboteeah
et al., 2008) we employ intercept-as-outcomes not the slopes-as-outcomes models. As we
wish to examine the effects of country level factors after controlling for all firm-level
factors, a random effects model (as opposed to a fixed effect model) is employed to deal
with variance in firm-level variables. The multilevel regression models are estimated
using.STATA's (11.0) xtmixedprogram with year-firm-country clustering to account for
time effects. This technique statistically models both within groups as well as betweengroups relationships taking into account the correlated nature of the data within groups
and differences across groups and therefore results in less biased estimates for standard
errors of regression coefficients. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008; Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).
4.4 RESULTS
Correlations and descriptive statistics are given in table 6 for the GLOBE measures
and in Table 7 for the Hofstede measures. As expected several of the national level
variables are highly correlated with one another. To assure that multicollinearity is not an
issue, variance inflation factors (VIF) were computed. For models using GLOBE
measures VIFs averaged 2.88, ranging from 1.22 to 5.66, all under the suggested value of
10 (Myers, 1990). For models with Hofstede measures, the VIFs were on average higher
averaging 4.90 and ranged from 1.19 to a problematic 11.41 (power distance). Because of
the relatively high VIFs associated with the Hofstede measures, the models with the
GLOBE measures are used for testing the hypotheses.
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Table 8 reports the results of the hierarchical linear modeling analyses. As a
preliminary analysis, the amount of between-group (country) variance in the data is first
estimated, as absence of this variance would suggest that differences between groups
(countries) in the data are inconsequential. The model includes no predictor variables and
indicates 27% of the variance was between country groups. 48% of the variance can be
attributed to differences between firms, 15% to year effects, and 9% of the variance is
captured in the error term.
To discern the hypothesized effects of independent explanatory and control variables
the models are built and tested in a hierarchical manner. Model 1 includes only control
variables. The control variable of firm age is marginally significant (p < .10) in all the
models. To test hypothesis 1 that attainment discrepancy is positively associated with
R&D investment, this variable is entered into the control model and as seen in Model 2
has a significantly positive coefficient (b^ 0.32, p < .01), thus indicating support for
hypothesis 1. The regression coefficient for this variable remains significant in both of
the subsequent models which incorporate the cultural dimensions, lending further support
for the hypothesis.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The results from the hierarchical linear modeling analyses for the national culture
effects as measured by GLOBE on firm level R&D investment are shown in model 3.
Hypothesis 2, which predicted a significant positive relationship between levels of FO in
a firm's home country national culture and firm level R&D investment, fails to find
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support. Hypothesis 3 testing whether the effects of high levels of IC in a firm's home
country national culture will be positively related to firm level R&D investment is
supported ( b = -0.88, p < .01). Hypothesis 4 suggesting that high levels of PD in a
firm's home country national culture will be negatively related to firm level R&D
investment, is strongly supported as the analysis indicates this variable has a highly
significant negative coefficient (b = -2.88, p < .001). Hypothesis 5, assessing whether
high levels of UA in a firm's home country national culture will be negatively related to
firm level R&D investment is also supported ( b = -0.90, p < .05).
In order to evaluate whether the hypothesized effects significantly add to the
explanation of firm level R&D investment, the change in the Wald x2 statistic is
examined. The addition of the attainment discrepancy variable to Model2 and the culture
variables to model 3 both result in statistically significant changes in the Wald %2 values.
It is acknowledged that the country level sample size is fairly low indicating it could
lack statistical power to detect all but the strongest effect sizes, making the analysis
subject to type II error (Snijders &Bosker, 2003). However, as the analysis indicates
substantial significant results for three of the four country level culture predictors, it
implies that the analysis has been able to detect effects even with a small sample size.
Sensitivity Analysis with Hofstede Measures
Model 4 uses the Hofstede culture measures that are associated with the GLOBE
measures used in the hypotheses. However, as reported previously, the high collinearity
between the Hofsteded variables may be problematic, thus these results should be viewed
with caution.

As with the results using the GLOBE measure for FO, the relationship between the
Hofstede long-term dimension and R&D investment is not statistically significant. The
Hofstede Individualism dimension is shown to have a significant positive relationship (b
= 0.03, p < .05). The PD measure does have the predicted significant negative
relationship (b = -0.04, p < .05). The regression coefficient for Hofstede's UA measure is
marginally significant, but not in the expected negative direction (b = 0.02, p < . 10).
These supportive and non-supportive sensitivity tests will be discussed in the next
section.
4.5 DISCUSSION
This study addresses the research questions of how performing better or worse than
competitors and how various dimensions of a firm's home country's national culture
influence firm level R&D investment decisions. We draw from behavioral theory of the
firm precepts and highlight the assumptions that firm behavior with respect to firm level
decisions is goal directed and history dependent. This notion underscores how differences
in values, beliefs and assumptions that make up a firm's home country national culture,
may motivate or constrain the pursuit of investment in R&D.
The theoretical predictions are tested using a sample of paper product industry firms
from 11 countries over the period 2002 - 2010. We examine the relationships of one
firm level determinant, performance attainment discrepancy, and four national culture
determinants with firm level R&D investments. The findings indicate that firms with
higher attainment discrepancies (performing above social aspiration level) have higher
levels of R&D investments supporting theoretical arguments that positive performance
relative to industry peers induces search mechanisms that would favor increased R&D

investment. R&D investment is often indicative of a firm's commitment and backing for
innovative initiatives, thus contributing to behavioral theory of the firm research by
providing support that innovative and experimental search is favored when performance
feedback is positive.
In testing effects of the national culture dimensions from the GLOBE framework, the
results failed to find support that high levels of FO have a positive influence on firm level
R&D investment. The lack significance may be associated with the sample of firms used.
First, all are publicly listed companies and researchers (e.g., Froot, Perold, & Stein, 1992)
have shown that stock price concerns of investors can affect R&D investments. If
investors have shorter time horizons, managers may be pressured to have them also
(Froot et al., 1992). Second, as the paper products industry is experiencing 'creative
destruction' pressures the notion that R&D is for long term payoffs or 'future' innovation
may not be applicable. Managers in this industry may view R&D initiatives as a means of
defending the current onslaught from digital media in order to stay in business
As hypothesized, IC in a firm's home country national culture was found to
encourage firm level R&D investment, while high levels of PD and UA in a firm's home
country national culture had a constraining influence. The findings suggest perceptions
and interpretations of performance feedback and future expectations concerning firm
level R&D investments are influenced by the firm's home country national culture.
Specifically, these type of investments are significantly enabled or constrained by what
constitutes legitimate actions with respect to how the society in a firm's home country
perceives the importance of: 1) collective coordination and decision making (IC), 2)
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maintenance of hierarchy and control (PD), and 3) dealing with ambiguous and uncertain
situations (UA).
In additional testing using measures from Hofstede's (2001) culture framework, some
areas of convergence with the GLOBE framework are found. Similar to the GLOBE
analysis LTO fails to find a statistically significant association to R&D investments while
PD is found to have a negative influence on firm R&D investment.
Individualism is shown to be positively related. This may seem to contradict the
finding of a positive relationship between the GLOBE measure of IC and R&D
investment, but we concur with arguments put forth by Brewer and Venaik (2011)
concerning what the two constructs are actually measuring and therefore do not view
Hofstede's individualism measure and GLOBE's IC necessarily as opposite poles of the
individualism - collectivism continuum. Nakata and Sivakumar, (1996) also argue and
demonstrate in a literature review of how the two constructs relate to product
development that the two constructs are not direct opposites and both impart positive
influence on new product development. Furthermore, the results provide complementary
support to those found by Taylor and Wilson (2012) which showed Hofstede's
individualism measure and GLOBE's IC were both positively associated with national
innovation rates.
The models with GLOBE measures showed UA had a significantly negative
relationship with R&D investment, while the model with the Hofstede measure indicates
it had a significantly positive relationship. These results lend support to work by Venaik
and Brewer (2010) who report a negative relationship between Hofstede's UA and
GLOBE's "as is" UA in a number of research studies on national differences across a

range of firm- and country-level phenomena. They suggest, the GLOBE UA is most
applicable when used for researching questions that relate to how rule orientation
practices influence phenomena and the Hofstede UA is more appropriate when research
is interested in stress. Furthermore, one of the items GLOBE uses for measuring "as is"
UA specifically references innovation: "In this society, orderliness and consistency are
stressed, even at the expense of experimentation and innovation." Thus, the GLOBE UA
appears to be more appropriate for the current analysis.
While scholars have examined industry- and firm-level drivers of firm R&D
investment, there have been very few cross-country comparisons, a recent notable
exception being Hillier et al. (2011) who demonstrated that national corporate
governance elements of 11 countries decreases the sensitivity of firm level R&D to
internal cash flow. This study, focusing on cultural dimensions or informal institutions of
a country's institutional environment complements their study, which focused on formal
regulative institutional elements.
In addition, scholars (e.g., Hart, 2001; Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 2002) have
highlighted that that previous research of firm level strategic decisions has mostly
examined the role of formal institutions. Since competitive environments are comprised
of both formal and informal institutions or "humanly-devised constraints that shape
human interaction" (North 1990: 3) by focusing on cultural dimensions that constitute
informal institutional forces, we contribute to the literature that seeks to further
understanding about how the institutional environments that firms are embedded in
through their founding, explain variation in investment decisions across firms. . Future
researchers may wish to consider how formal and informal institutions in combination
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may moderate or mediate one another in explaining variance in multinational firm
investment decisions.
As with all research, the findings should be considered in the context of certain
limitations. The culture variables used in the analyses are assumed to be constant over
time, and while there is precedence in the literature for this assumption (Hofstede, 2001)
we recognize there may be dimensions that are not as enduring as expected.
Additionally, the study was conducted within the paper products industry and the use of a
single industry may limit the general applicability of the results. As mentioned before,
this industry is arguably in the "gale of creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942:83) with
the rise of digital media and environmental sustainability pressures. It would be
interesting to examine the linkages between outperforming peers along with national
culture in other industries and additional countries to verify the findings or to learn how
different industry or county contexts affect the significant relationships.
The study evaluated direct effects of firm and country level constructs on firm level
R&D investment, while accounting for the nested nature of the data, with firms
embedded within countries. Our use of hierarchical linear modeling statistical techniques
allowed us to simultaneously examine relationships within firms and countries as well as
between firms and countries. With only 11 countries, there is not sufficient statistical
power to estimate a model at the country level with cross-level interactions (Raudenbush
& Bryk, 2002; Lam, Aheame, & Schillewaert, 2012) Future researchers, with larger
sample sizes may find it fruitful to assess interactions between firm-level variables such
as attainment discrepancy and national culture variables. This would provide the
opportunity to evaluate whether firm and national level determinants function as
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substitutes or interact in mutually reinforcing ways as complements, in explaining
variance in firm level phenomena.
While the culture variables used in the analysis were selected based on previous
theory and empirical results, we readily recognize that other cultural dimensions may also
impact R&D investment, and hope this work will motivate others to consider additional
cultural dimensions. Additionally, consideration of other dependent variables that also
represent high risk firm level investments, such as acquisitions, new product launches or
major capital investments, may provide insights into how variation in national cultural
dimensions impacts overall firm level risk taking or give insights into how the type of
decision being made may affect the various relationships.
Finally, all of the measures came from archival data. We suggest research that can
also capture subjective perceptions of why decision makers from a variety of national
cultures perceive investing in R&D is an appropriate decision for his or her firm would
add significantly to managerial risk taking knowledge and what is known about how
national culture impacts firm level decisions.
Investing in R&D processes to create knowledge and generate innovation is
particularly relevant for firms competing in today's increasingly competitive globalized
knowledge-based economy. Consequently, this research may also serve to inform
practicing managers and policy makers who wish to generate economic growth by
enacting policies and regulations supporting investments in R&D and ultimately
innovations. While changing culture is far from easy or quick, embracing the notion that
IC supports investment in innovation and understanding that enacting policies that serve
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to lower PD and UA may help motivate firms around the globe to invest more in R&D so
as create, share and apply new knowledge, appears to be a very worthwhile goal.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Collectively, the three essays seek to address the overarching research question of
how and why firm decision makers vary in strategic risk taking, defined to be making
decisions involving investment and commitment of resources prior to fully understanding
the potential performance outcomes, which may be positive or negative. Each essay
considered an overlooked or understudied determinant of strategic risk taking in
conjunction with previously studied constructs. Each essay also examined different
representations of strategic risk taking that have been used in the extant literature: a
composite measure consisting of the monetary value of R&D, capital, and acquisition
investments; the frequency of cross-border acquisitions; and R&D investments scaled by
sales.
Essay 1 shows how the experience of power not only provides the means for CEOs to
exert their risk preferences but actually affects what the risk preferences are. CEO power
is theorized and empirically shown to influence cognitive framing such that there is a
prevailing focus on the upsides of potential outcomes of strategic risk taking. Previous
literature has theorized and shown that stock options have similar effects, thus I propose
power and stock options may interact in substitutive or complementary ways. The
analysis indicates CEO power interacts in a complementary, mutually reinforcing manner
with exercisable stock options while it interacts in a substitutive way with unexercisable
stock options with respect to promoting strategic risk taking. All five hypotheses are
supported.
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In essay 2 drawing from the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998), and the notion that individual compensation element have particular risk bearing
attributes, I examine how retirement pay and in-the-money stock oprtions influence CEO
motivations to engage in cross-border acquisitions. The moderating role of managerial
discretion, disaggregated into industry and organizational discretion was also examined.
The theoretical model is tested in a sample of U.S. public companies operating in four
industries from 2007 - 2011. I find support for the hypothesized direct positive effects of
CEO retirement pay and in-the-money stock options with cross-border acquisition
activity. Hypotheses predicting positive moderating effects of industry discretion and
organizational discretion, measured as CEO duality, are only supported when interacted
with CEO in-the-money stock options not CEO retirement pay.
In essay 3, a multilevel theoretical model is presented and tested with a sample of
paper product industry firms from 11 countries. As the model contains both firm and
country level variables, it implies a composite error term because it can be broken down
into several error terms, some of which are dependent on the lower level variables
(leading to heteroskedasticity). Also, because of the nested nature of the data, it is likely
the error terms associated with firms in the same country are most likely not independent
of each other (hence there is autocorrelation). As the number of firms varies across
countries, there is also the possibility that a country level variable coefficient may
indicate significance due to a disproportionately larger sample size at the firm level. To
address these potential issues, multilevel statistical techniques are used.
The results support the hypothesis that outperforming competitors in the past
(positive attainment discrepancy) motivates R&D investment. The hypothesis predicting

that the national social cultural dimension of institutional collectivism in a firm's home
country encourages R&D investment is supported. The dimensions of power distance and
uncertainty avoidance in a firm's home country, as hypothesized are found to be
negatively related to firm level R&D investment. The hypothesis predicting a positive
association between firm home country future orientation and R&D investment fails to
find support.
The theoretical contributions for each essay have been discussed in the introduction
and discussion sections for each study. Overall, by drawing from and integrating social
psychology theory with organizational theory, the dissertation furthers understanding of
how individual decision makers (micro level) directly and indirectly influence corporate
outcomes (macro level). Essays 1 and 2 focus on how a CEO's experience of power and
gaining wealth impact cognitive processing of the acceptability of risk taking on behalf
of the organizations s/he leads. Thus the dissertation addresses concerns put forth by
Finkelstein et al. (2009: 69), that "substantial work needs to be done on the antecedents,
or determinants of managers' cognitive models" and that "the distinct influence of
different types of experience in shaping cognitions needs to be understood" (2009: 70).
Essay 3, by combining behavioral theory of the firm assumptions with national social
culture literature, enhances understanding of how the informal institutional environment
in which the firm is embedded influences firm level strategies.
In sum, the dissertation seeks to respond to calls by organizational scholars to bridge
micro and macro perspectives (Aguinis, Boyd, Pierce, & Short, 2011; Rousseau, 2011),
to relate the firm and its strategies to its institutional context (Wright, Filatotchev,
Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005), broaden the existing scope of executive compensation
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research (Devers et al., 2007), and challenge traditional assumptions about agency theory
predictions (Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni, & Vigano, 2011). I hope the insights generated
will provide motivation and greater flexibility to researchers interested in exploring links
between decision makers and organizational outcomes.
The theorizing and findings of the dissertation essays have implications for practice.
All three essays placed emphasis on the influence of decision makers' cognitive
processing of the potential outcomes of risk taking decisions. Risk taking arguably has a
prominent role in the job descriptions of the powerful men and women leading
corporations in today's business environment. It may be the key to success or failure for
these individuals as well as the organizations they lead. Awareness that fundamental
attributes associated with the experience of being a CEO, power and compensation may
have significant influence on how potential outcomes of risk taking decisions are
cognitively processed, may assist CEOs in making more prudent and wise risk taking
decisions on behalf of the organizations they lead. In addition, understanding that a firm's
home country culture may influence the way risk taking and goal directed behavior is
enacted may help managers make more informed decisions with respect to their own firm
strategies as well as assessing competitors' actions.
Theoretical arguments and empirical results presented in the dissertation also offer
direction to policy makers and board members at a time when there is an increased focus
on enhancing or modifying management systems that will facilitate appropriate
managerial risk taking. The recently (February 28, 2010) enacted Dodd-Frank Act,
requiring board risk management committees for all U.S. publicly traded bank holding
companies with total assets of $10 million USD or more as well as for systemically
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important publicly traded non-bank financial companies, highlights the relevance the key
findings of this dissertation may have. Corporate directors as well as CEOs may find it
useful to take into consideration not only the types of risks their firms are undertaking but
as the research presented in the dissertation highlights, considering how organizational
factors affect the underlying psychological processes of decision makers. This in turn
may lead to more effective evaluation of the acceptability of strategic risk taking in
organizations.
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TABLE 1
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics- Essay 1
Variables

Mean

s.d.

VIF

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

Strategic Risk Taking

970.4

2457.1

2

CEO power

0.01

2.26

1.95

.02

3

CEO exercisable
stock options
CEO unexercisable
stock options
CEO ownership

7.32

3.29

1.55

.11

.09

5.63

3.39

1.47

.10

-.07

.49

8.79

2.80

1.31

.16

.31

.21

.07

7.05

0.88

1.61

.24

-.08

.35

.32

.05

4
5
6

7

9

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

7

CEO cash
compensation
CEO gender

0.02

0.14

1.03

-.01

-.03

-.04

-.00

-.01

.06

8

CEO age

56.1

7.53

1.45

.02

.21

.05

-.05

.15

.12

-.05

9

New CEO

0.04

0.20

1.14

-.02

-.27

-.20

-.04

-.17

-.01

.03

-.06

10

CEO tenure

10.26

9.33

2.71

-.07

.62

.00

-.13

.32

-.10

-.07

.47

-.24

11

Board size

10.2

3.47

1.79

.27

-.06

.05

.03

.04

.17

-.01

.03

-.00

-.13

12

0.80

0.10

1.23

.09

-.13

.09

.16

-.10

.25

.06

-.04

.01

-.27

.10

7.47

3.31

1.28

.03

-.05

.00

-.06

.10

.02

-.02

.13

.00

.28

.01

-.08

25.16

43.98

1.10

-.04

.03

.13

.21

.02

.10

.02

-.04

-.04

-.03

-.03

.02

-.07

15

Proportion of outside
directors
Outside directors'
average board tenure
Prior Firm
Performance
Unabsorbed slack

2.49

2.56

1.22

-.11

.05

-.02

-.05

-.03

-.20

-.02

-.03

-.01

.07

-.23

-.19

.04

16

Potential slack

0.96

1.55

1.53

-.02

.01

-.04

-.03

-.04

-.02

.03

-.02

-.01

-.01

.09

-.02

-.02

-.01

-.02

17

Firm size

7.39

1.62

1.95

.48

-.11

.19

.20

.19

.46

.02

.07

.02

-.14

.45

.22

.03

-.04

-.36

.02

18

Firm age

43.00

38.37

1.21

.12

-.13

.00

-.02

.02

.13

.09

.13

.01

-.03

.23

.13

.22

-.07

-.16

.01

.25

19

Discretion

4.75

1.27

1.19

-.10

.07

.03

.02

-.00

-.13

.04

-.15

.00

.04

-.24

-.12

-.05

-.07

.19

-.02

"

13
14

Correlations greater than .05 or less than -.05 are significant at p < .05.

18

-.03

-15

TABLE 2
Results of Generalized Least Squares Regression Models for Strategic Risk Taking
Model 1:
Controls

Variables

Model 2:
Main Effects

Model 3:
Power x Exercisable
Stock Options

Model 4:
Power x Unexercisable
Stock Options

Model 5:
Complete Model

CEO ownership

0.09*"

(0.02)

0.07***

(0.02)

0.08***

(0.02)

0.08*"

(0.02)

0.08

(0.02)

CEO cash compensation

0.02

(0.03)

0.01

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

0.01

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

CEO gender

-0.03

(0.02)

-0.03

(0.02)

-0.03

(0.02)

-0.03

(0.02)

-0.03

(0.02)

CEO age

-0.01

(0.03)

-0.01

(0.03)

-0.01

(0.03)

-0.01

(0.03)

-0.01

(0.03)

New CEO

-0.01

(0.02)

0.00

(0.02)

0.00

(0.02)

0.00

(0.02)

-0.01

(0.02)

CEO tenure

-0.03

(0.03)

-0.07*

(0.04)

-0.06

(0.04)

-0.07*

(0.04)

-0.05

(0.04)

Board size

0.11*"

(0.03)

0.11*"

(0.03)

0.11***

(0.03)

0.11"

(0.03)

0.11"*

(0.03)

Proportion of outside
directors
Outside director' average
board tenure
Prior firm performance

0.01

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

0.00

(0.03)

0.02

(0.03)

0.04

(0.03)

0.04

(0.03)

0.04

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.02

(0.02)

0.01

(0.02)

0.01

(0.02)

0.01

(0.02)

0.01

(0.02)

Unabsorbed slack

0.04

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

Potential slack

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

Firm size

0.28"*

(0.03)

0.27*"*

(0.03)

0.27

(0.03)

0.27***

(0.03)

0.27*"

(0.03)

Firm age

-0.01

(0.04)

0.00

(0.04)

0.00

(0.04)

0.00

(0.04)

0.00

(0.03)

Industry discretion

-0.02

(0.03)

-0.03

(0.03)

-0.03

(0.03)

-0.03

(0.03)

-0.03

(0.03)

Year 1

-0.02

(0.03)

-0.02

(0.03)

-0.02

(0.03)

-0.02

(0.03)

-0.02

(0.03)

Year 2

0.01

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

0.03

(0.03)

Year 3

0.05

(0.03)

0.05

(0.03)

0.05*

(0.03)

0.05*

(0.03)

0.05*

(0.03)

CEO power

0.08"*

(0.03)

0.06*

(0.03)

0.06*

(0.03)

0.04

(0.03)

CEO exercisable stock
options
CEO unexercisable stock
options
CEO power x CEO
exercisable stock options
CEO power x CEO
unexercisable stock
options
Wald t
Change in Wald x2

0.04*

(0.03)

0.04*

(0.03)

0.04*

(0.03)

0.04*

(0.03)

0.05*

(0.02)

0.05*

(0.02)

0.05*

(0.02)

0.05"

(0.02)

0.05"

(0.02)

0.05"

(0.02)

-0,04*

(0.02)

* p < .05, **p<.01,***p<.001

-0.04*

220.68

241.10
20.42"

(0.02)

246.68

244.92

5.58*

3.82

252.31
11.21"

N = 1574 standardized regression coeflFicients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 3
Mean Values of Variables by Industry
Variable
Number of observations
Number of Firms
Cross-border acquisition activity
CEO retirement pay
CEO in-the-money stock options
Industry discretion
CEO duality
CEO equity ownership
CEO cash compensation
CEO age
Firm age
Firm size
Prior firm performance
Foreign sales
Domestic acquisitions

Communications
All
industries
175
543
37
124
0.47
0.46
5.88
7.06
6.09
6.65
5.28
4.36
0.59
0.68
8.38
8.88
6.80
6.88
57.15
56.1
69.18
71.5
8.15
9.57
17.05
12.9
42.45
46.2
0.81
0.88

Defense

Paper & Packaging

Oil & Gas

156
35
0.59
7.25
7.32
4.90
0.78
8.82
6.89
58.2
69.5
9.43
14.8
41.3
1.03

102
24
0.45
7.91
5.08
3.74
0.69
8.55
6.85
56.7
84.9
8.79
22.3
35.4
0.49

110
28
0.35
7.88
8.04
2.71
0.69
10.08
7.03
57.7
50.4
10.64
10.0
44.6
0,71

TABLE 4
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics - Essay 2
Variables

Std.
Dev.

VIF

1

3

2

4

5

6

7

.12
.20
.06
.23

.10
.06
.30

-.12
-.14
.18

-.20
.05
.18

8

9

-.10
-.01
.00
-.01
-.01

.00
.04
.11

10

11

12

-.02
.09
.16

-.03
-.02

-.00

Cross-border acquisition activity

-.08
.22
.33
.28
.08
.18
-.08

i
O
L/»

•

-.01
-.24
-.06
-.03
.11

.02
.17

.02
.08

*i

-.18
.31
.27
.30
.09
.06
.28
-.03
.02
.13

.28
.17
.10
.13
.19
-.04
-.11
.14

©
00

.25

o

0.47
0.97
7.06
3.36
1.35
CEO retirement pay
.18
6.65
3.89
1.38
CEO in-the-money stock options
.16
4.36
Industry discretion
0.81
.07
1.17
0.68
CEO duality
0.46
.17
1.30
8.88
CEO equity ownership
2.17
1.46
.12
6.88
CEO cash compensation
1.08
1.32
.12
7.32
CEO age
3.29
1.11 -.02
9 Finn age
5.63
3.39
1.09
.12
10 Firm size
8.79
2.80
1.29
.12
11 Prior firm performance
17.05
8.88
1.08 -.01
12 Foreign sales
0.02
1.07
0.14
.11
13 Domestic acquisitions
56.1
.35
7.53
1.13
Correlations greater than .05 or less than -.05 are significant at p < .05.

©
o

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Mean

TABLE 5
Results of Negative Binomial Regression for Cross-border Acquisition Activity
Model 1:
Controls

Variables

Model 2:
Main Effects

Model 3:
Industry Discretion
Interactions

Model 4:
CEO Duality
Interactions

Model 5:
Complete Model

CEO equity ownership
CEO cash
compensation
CEO age

0.13

(0.11)

0.07

(0.12)

0.06

(0.12)

0.06

(0.12)

0.04

(0.13)

-0.02

(0.09)

-0.10

(0.10)

-0,13

(0.11)

-0.13

(0.10)

-0.16

(0.11)

0.00

(0.12)

-0.04

(0.12)

-0.05

(0.12)

-0.08

(0.12)

-0.08

(0.12)

Firm age

0.09

(0.09)

0.07

(0.09)

0.06

(0.09)

0.07

(0.09)

0.05

(0.11)

Firm size

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.01)

Prior firm performance

0.06

(0.10)

0.06

(0.10)

0.04

(0.10)

0.04

(0.10)

0.02

(0.11)

Foreign sales

0.30

(0.13)

0.27

(0.12)

0.24*

(0.12)

0.26*

(0.12)

0.23*

(0.13)

a

.*•

Domestic acquisitions

0.19

(0.07)

0.20

(0.07)

0,17"

(0.07)

0.17

(0.07)

0.14*

(0.06)

Year 1

0.12

(0.11)

0.14

(0.11)

0.12

(0.11)

0.13

(0.11)

0.10

(0.11)

Year 2

0.24**

(0.10)

0.22"

(0.10)

0.21*

(0.10)

0.21*

(0.10)

0.20'

(0.10)

Year 3

0.13

(0.10)

0.17

(0.11)

0.16

(0.11)

0.18*

(0.11)

0.18*

(0.11)

Year 4

0.12
0.21"

(0.10)

0.14
0.24"

(0.10)

0.14
0.23

(0.10)

0.15

(0.10)

0.16

(0.10)

(0.12)

(0.15)

0.22'

(0.13)

0.22

(0.16)

(0.12)

(0.12)

©

Lo
o

•

Industry discretion

(0.12)

CEO retirement pay

0.22*

(0.13)

0.38*

(0.17)

0.20

(0.13)

0.35*

(0.18)

CEO in-the-money
stock options
CEO retirement pay
X Industry discretion
CEO in-the-money
stock options X

0.21*

(0.12)

0.18

(0.12)

0.19

(0.13)

0.16

(0.13)

-0.25

(0.19)

-0.27

(0.20)

0.42"*

(0.13)

0.45*"*

(0.13)

CEO duality

0.37"

- - ••

0.26*

(0.12)

0.33

(0.13)

0.31

(0.13)

Industry discretion
CEO retirement pay
X CEO duality
CEO in-the-money
stock options
X CEO duality
Wald t
Change in Wald x2

39.91***

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

48.76***
8.85*

58.46***
9.70**

N = 543

Standardized regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.

0.04

(0.13)

0.07

(0.14)

0.26*

(0.12)

0.26"*

(0.11)

51.40***
2.64

61,17***
12.41*

TABLE 6
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics with GLOBE Measures - Essay 3

Std.
Mean

Dev.

viF
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1

R&D Investment

3.38

1.33

2

Attainment discrepancy

-0.07

0.33

1.28

0.26*

3

Future orientation

4.16

0.15

1.76

0.36*

0.05

4

Institutional collectivism

4.74

0.43

2.24

0.11*

-0.22*

-0.02

5

Power distance

5.18

0.28

5.63

-0.45*

-0.28*

-0.49*

0.34*

6

Uncertainty avoidance

4.18

0.45

3.32

0.16*

0.03

0.43*

-0.25*

-0.64*

7

Potential slack

0.35

0.14

1.44

-0.23*

0.16*

0.00

0.07

0.20*

-0.15*

8

Unabsoibed slack

-0.01

0.08

1.22

0.22*

0.13*

0.06

0.00

-0.23*

0.01

-0.22*

9

Firm size

6.60

1.97

2.44

0.26*

0.28*

0.27*

-0.07

-0.65*

0.39*

0.07

0.26*

10

Firm age

58.2

39.8

1.30

0.26*

0.09*

0.39*

-0.08*

-0.31*

0.28*

-0.19*

0.12*

0.15*

11

Shareholder protection

6.21

1.26

5.66

0.11

0.21*

0.34*

-0.62*

-0.55*

0.60*

-0.14*

0.03

0.34*

0.23*

12

Financial system support

6.59

1.42

4.32

0.10

0.25*

0.26*

-0.64*

-0.51*

0.45*

-0.11*

0.01

0.25*

0.19*

0.65*

13

GDP per capita

26.36

13.3

2.82

0.42*

0.20*

0.16*

-0.03

-0.59*

0.08*

-0.25*

0.31*

0.57*

0.23*

0.21*

*p < .05

TABLE 7
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics with Hofstede Measures - Essay 3

Mean

Std.
Dev.

1 R&D Investment

3.38

1.33

2

Attainment discrepancy

-0.07

0.33

1.27

0.26*

3

Long term

59.14

14.75

9.82

0.13*

-0.24*

4

Individualism

52.47

26.78

6.12

0.27*

0.30*

-0.88*

5

Power distance

53.36

14,75

11.41

-0.43*

-0.18*

0.69*

-0.66*

6 Uncertainty avoidance

62.67

22.85

5.07

0.18*

-0.16*

0.68*

-0.60*

0.12*

7

Potential slack

0.35

0.14

1.45

-0.24*

0.16*

0.21*

-0.19*

0.29*

0.11*

8

Unabsorbed slack

-0.01

0.08

1.23

0.22*

0.13*

-0,17*

0.19*

-0.32*

0.06

-0.22*

9

Firm size

6.60

1.97

2.41

0.25*

0.28*

-0.35*

0.42*

-0.65*

-0.04

0.06

0.26*

10

Firm age

58.2

39.8

1.19

0.25*

0.09*

-0,29*

0.33*

-0.33*

-0.15*

-0.19*

0.12*

0.15*

11

Shareholder protection

6.21

1.26

7.00

0.10*

0.21*

-0.79*

0.69*

-0.52*

-0.71*

-0.15*

0.02

0.33*

0.23*

12

Financial system support

6.59

1.42

4.18

0.10*

0.24*

-0.68*

0.65*

-0.40*

-0.63*

-0.11*

0.01

0.25*

0.19*

0.86*

13

GDP per capita

26.36

13.3

7.58

0.44*

0.21*

-0.47*

0.53*

-0.87*

0.13*

-0.25*

0.32*

0.61*

0.25*

0.24*

VIF

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

*p < .05

o

TABLE 8
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling for R&D Investment

Controls Only

b
Firm Level
0.00
Potential slack
0.44
Unabsorbed slack
0.02
Firm size
O.Olf
Firm Age
Attainment discrepancy
Country Level
0.06
Shareholder protection
-0.02
Financial system support
-O.Olf
GDP per capita
GLOBE Future Orientation
GLOBE Institutional Collectivism
GLOBE Power Distance
GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance
HOFSTEDE Long Term Orientation
HOFSTEDE Individualism
HOFSTEDE Power Distance
HOFSTEDE Uncertainty Avoidance

Attainment
Discrepancy

Full Model with
GLOBE
National Culture

Full Model with
Hofstede
National Culture

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

0.00
0.35
0.07
0.00

-0.00
0,37
0.02
O.Olf
0.32**

0.00
0.35
0.07
0.00
0.12

-0.00
0.39
-0.01
O.Olf
0.31**

0.00
0.35
0.07
0.00
0.12

-0.00
0.32
-0.03
O.Olf
0.31**

0.00
0.37
0.08
0.00
0.12

0.05
0.05
0.01

0.04
-0.02
-0.01

0.05
0.04
0.01

0.04
-0.02
-0.01
0.74
0.88**
-2.88***
-0.90*

0.05
0.04
0.01
1.08
0.36
0.85
0.44

0.05
-0.03
-0.02

0.05
0.04
0.01*

0.02f
0.03*
-0.04*
0.02

0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01

Wald x2
Change in Wald %2
f p < . 10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001

8.70

15.8*
7.1**

38.7***
30.0***

41.7***
33.0***
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FIGURE 1
Model for Direct and Interactive Effects of CEO Power and the
Accumulated Value of Exercisable and Unexercisable Stock Options
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FIGURE 2
Interaction between CEO Power and the Accumulated Value of
Exercisable Stock Options
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FIGURE 3
Interaction between CEO Power and the Accumulated Value of
Unexercisable Stock Options
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FIGURE 4
Model of the Relationships between CEO Retirement Pay and in-the-money Stock
Options with Cross-border Acquisitions
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FIGURE 5
Moderating Influence of Industry Discretion on the Relationship between CEO inthe-money Stock Options and Cross-border Acquisitions
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FIGURE 6
Moderating Influence of CEO Duality on the Relationship between CEO in-themoney Stock Options and Cross-border Acquisitions
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